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ABSTRACT
Exchange rates have been at the center of economic debates in emerging economies.  Issues related
to the feasibility of flexible exchange rates, the relationship between exchange rate volatility and growth, and
the role of exchange rate overvaluation in recent crises, among other, have been extensively discussed
during the last few years.  In this paper we address some of the most important exchange rate-related issues
in emerging economies.  In particular, we deal with:  (a) the merits of alternative exchange rate regimes:
(b) the extent to which purchasing power parity holds in the long run in these countries;  and (c) models to
assess real exchange rate overvaluation.  We also discuss future areas for research on exchange rates in
the emerging nations.
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For the last two decades exchange rates have been at the center of policy debates in
developing and transition economies.  Controversies have abounded, and theoretical as well as applied
questions have been discussed vehemently among academics and policy makers.  Some of the policy
issues that have captured analysts’ interests include:  Should nominal exchange rate anchors be used
during the early phases of a stabilization program?  Are floating exchange rates viable in emerging
economies?  Does real exchange rate overvaluation always precede currency crises?  Recent
developments have contributed to maintain these questions at the forefront of policy discussions.  Some
of the actors have changed, but the script remains pretty much the same.  Examples of the policy
questions that occupy much of the attention at present are: Should Mexico abandon its floating
exchange rate and adopt a more “predictable” system?  Could Russia have avoided the August 1998
devaluation of the rouble?  Should the East Asian countries peg their exchange rates to restore price
and output stability?  Should Argentina exit its currency board and move towards a more flexible
regime?  There is every indication that questions of this type will remain prominent in the months and
years to come.
In this paper we address some important exchange rate-related issues in developing and
transition economies.  We critically review the theoretical and, especially, the empirical literature that
focuses on these economies, and we identify some of the areas where knowledge is still limited.  Our
analysis is deliberately selective, and concentrates on:
C The relationship between nominal exchange rate regimes and economic performance.3
C The feasibility of adopting floating exchange rates in developing countries.
C The long-run empirical features of real exchange rates in emerging economies.
C The extent to which purchasing power parity (PPP) provides a useful yardstick for
assessing exchange rate behavior in these economies.
C Models and methods commonly employed to assess real exchange rate misalignment.
We are, of course, aware that this is a partial list of issues;  it would be utterly impossible to
deal with every exchange rate-related question in a limited space.  However, in the concluding section
of this paper we address briefly some additional problems that have emerged in recent exchange rate
debates.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section II focuses on nominal exchange rate
regimes.  In it we try to explain the rather abrupt decline in the number of developing countries with
formally pegged exchange rates, and we review the evidence on the relationship between exchange rate
regimes and economic performance.  This discussion deals with inflation and economic growth, and
focuses on some of the methodological shortcomings encountered in this literature.  Finally, in this
section we also provide some evidence, based on Mexico’s recent (post 1994) experience, on the
feasibility of floating exchange rates in developing countries.  In Section III we deal with the economics
of real exchange rates.  We start with a discussion of the empirical evidence on the time series
characteristics of real exchange rates in emerging economies.  The analysis focuses on stationarity issues
and emphasizes the difference between short and long term analyses of purchasing power parity (PPP). 
We make the point that most of economists’ beliefs on the subject are based on limited evidence from
the advanced nations, and we argue that additional work on the developing countries is needed.  In this4
section we also address the issue of the relationship between productivity growth and deviations from
PPP--the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect.  Section IV deals with the important issue of real
exchange rate misalignment.  We critically evaluate existing models for assessing whether a country’s
currency is misaligned, and we argue that most of the popular approaches are subject to serious
methodological as well as empirical shortcomings.  We argue that future work on this area should aim at
integrating real exchange rate analyses with analyses of current account “sustainability.”  Section V
presents the conclusions.  We summarize our main findings and provide a brief discussion of other areas
in which, in our view, the economics profession needs to (significantly) improve its knowledge about
exchange rates in emerging economies.
II.  Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and Macroeconomic Performance
The modern literature on exchange rate regimes has emphasized the existence of important
tradeoffs between credibility and flexibility (Frankel, 1995, Rodrik, 1992, Edwards, 1996).  In doing
this, however, most theoretical analyses have considered two highly simplified extreme cases: (i) a fully
flexible (or floating) exchange rate with minimal central bank intervention; and (ii) an irrevocably (and
credibly) fixed nominal exchange rate. According to this bipolar characterization, a flexible exchange
 
rate regime allows a country to have an independent monetary policy, providing the economy with
flexibility to accommodate domestic and foreign shocks, including changes in external terms of trade
and interest rates.  This flexibility, however, usually comes at the cost of some loss in credibility and,
thus, tends to be associated (on average) with higher inflation.  Alternatively, fixed exchange rates
reduce the degree of flexibility of the system but impart (in theory) a higher degree of credibility to
policy making.  Since the public believes that, under fixed rates, the primary goal of monetary policy is5
to preserve the exchange rate parity, they moderate their wage and price expectations, thus allowing the
economy to attain a lower rate of inflation.  This analysis assumes that under a fixed exchange rate
regime the authorities are always more disciplined and, thus, that the fixed exchange rate is never
abandoned--that is, devaluations are not an option.  This, of course, is an oversimplification.  In fact, as
history has shown again and again, fixed exchange rates often fail to impose macroeconomic discipline
and end up in major devaluation crises (see, for example, Cooper, 1971, Kamin, 1988, and Edwards,
1989).  For this reason, a number of analysts that favor credibility over flexibility increasingly argue that
fixed exchange rates are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for achieving macroeconomic stability,
and that additional institutional constraints on policy makers--even at the constitutional level--have to be
devised. 
Purely floating and fixed systems are, of course, only two of the possible exchange rate regimes
a country can choose.  In reality, there are many layers between these two extremes.  Table 1 contains
a list of nine alternative exchange rate regimes, ranked according to the degree of flexibility that they
impart to the economy or, in inverse order, according to the relative stability they afford to the nominal
exchange rate.   The table describes briefly the main features of each regime, summarizes their alleged
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merits and shortcomings, and mentions a few relevant historical experiences.  One thing the table makes
clear is that the profusion of exchange rate  systems and the blurred boundaries between many of them
makes any attempt to empirically determine the merits of alternative regimes extremely difficult.  We
deal with this issue in greater detail below.Table 1.  Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes
Regime Main Features Main  Benefits  Main Shortcomings         Key episodes /Comments
1.  Free Float -Value of foreign exchange freely determined in the -Changes in nominal exchange rate  -High nominal (and real) exchange rate volatility -Virtually no country has a pure float. The
market.  Actual and expected changes in demand/supply shoulder bulk of adjustment to foreign may distort resource allocation. United States, Germany,  Switzerland (and
of assets and goods reflected in exchange rate changes. and domestic shocks.  Japan, according to some) come close.
-High international reserves not required. nominal anchors different from the exchange rate; 
-Monetary policy needs to be framed in terms of
scope for discretion and inflation bias may be large.
2.  “Dirty” Float    -Same as in a free float,  except that higher -Lack of transparency of central bank behavior may -Many advanced economies have adopted this
-Sporadic central bank interventions in foreign exchange
market. Modes and frequency of intervention vary, as do
the objectives guiding the intervention . 
-Active intervention (sterilized and non-sterilized) others) .  -Mexico adopted a system similar to
results in changes in international reserves. Indirect this following the 1994-95 crisis. 
intervention (through changes in interest rates,
liquidity and other financial instruments) does not
result in changes in reserves.
international reserves may be needed.  introduce too much uncertainty.  regime—Canada, Australia (Japan, according to
- Dampens “excessive” fluctuations of -Effects of intervention are typically short-lived
exchange rates. (even when intended as a signal) and may be
destabilizing. -A dirty float could be thought of as a managed
float with wide bands, with the (undisclosed)
position of the bands providing the criterion
for intervention.
3.   Floating within a            -The nominal exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate -System combines the benefits of some -In some cases (especially when the band is too -The Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Band  (somewhat freely) within a band. The center of the band flexibility with some credibility.  narrow and when domestic macro policies are not Monetary System is the best known example of
      (Target  zone) -Key parameters (bands, mid-point) help is a fixed rate, either in terms of one currency or of a consistent with a “horizontal” band) the system this type of regime. 
basket of currencies. The width of the band varies (in the can be destabilizing and prone to speculative
ERM it was originally ± 2.25 percent).  attacks. 
- Some band systems are the result of cooperative -Selecting the width of the band is not trivial.  speculative pressures, and even collapse, when
arrangements, others are unilateral.  currencies become misaligned and central
guide the public’s expectations. - The ERM crises of 1992-93 showed clearly
- Changes in the nominal rate within the
bands help absorb  shocks to
fundamentals. -Systems that allow for the possibility of
realignment of the bands and central parity weaken
the credibility afforded by the regime.
that the system can be subjected to severe
banks are hesitant to defend the bands.
4.  Sliding Band -There is no commitment by the authorities to maintain -The system allows countries with an -The fact that the timing and size of central parity -Israel had a system similar to this from early
the central parity “indefinitely”.  Instead, it is clear at ongoing rate of inflation higher than adjustments are unknown, introduces considerable 1989 to December 1991.
the outset that the central parity will be adjusted world inflation to adopt a band without uncertainty, which often leads to high interest rate
periodically (e.g., due to  competitiveness having to experience a severe real volatility.
considerations). appreciation.
-The system is an adaptation of the band regime to the difficult to choose the appropriate width for the
case of high-inflation economies. band.
-As in the case of the standard band system, it is alternatives, such as the crawling band.
-The uncertainty and volatility associated with
this system makes it less attractive than other
5.  Crawling Band -A band system whereby the central parity crawls over -System allows high inflation countries to -Choosing the criteria for setting the rate of crawl -Israel adopted this system in December 1991.
time.  adopt a band system without having to entails serious risks.  A backward-looking Chile had a widening band system from 1986 to
-Different rules can be used to determine the rate of crawl.
The two most common are:  backward-looking crawl 
(e.g., based on past inflation differentials), and forward-
looking crawl  (e.g., based on the expected, or target, rate
of inflation).  
undertake (large) stepwise adjustments of approach can introduce considerable inflationary mid-1998.  Italy also had, effectively, a system
the central parity. inertia into the system. A forward-looking of this type  between 1979 and 1991.
approach that sets the “wrong”  inflation target can
produce overvaluation and give rise to speculative
pressures.Table 1 (Concluded).  Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes
Regime Main Features Main Benefits  Main Shortcomings Key Episodes/Comments
6.  Crawling peg -The nominal exchange rate is adjusted periodically -Allows high-inflation countries to avoid -A pure backward-looking crawling peg  -This system became popular in the 1960s and
according to a set of indicators severe real exchange rate overvaluation.  1970s in Chile, Colombia and Brazil. It had its
(usually lagged inflation differentials) and is not -The “tablita” variant helps to guide the according to past inflation differentials) introduces
allowed the fluctuate beyond a narrow range (say, two public’s expectations,  and buys a limited inflationary inertia and may eventually cause
percent). amount of credibility. monetary policy to lose its role as nominal anchor. 
-One variant of the system consists of adjusting the -Equilibrium changes in the real exchange rate are
nominal rate by a pre-announced rate set deliberately difficult to accommodate.
below ongoing inflation (variant known as a “tablita”
regime). 
(where the nominal rate is mechanically adjusted
-A “tablita” system will not last if fiscal and
incomes policies are not supportive.
longer running in Colombia, which to this date
has a high degree of inflationary inertia.  
7.  Fixed-but-     -The regime epitomized by the Bretton Woods system. -Provides macroeconomic discipline by -Realignments (devaluations) under this system -The most popular regime of this century. Most
     adjustable 
     exchange rate
The nominal exchange rate is fixed, but the central bank maintaining (tradable good prices) in line have typically been large and disruptive developing countries held on to (variants of) it
is not obliged to maintain the parity indefinitely.  No with foreign prices in a context of (introducing uncertainty and inflationary after the formal  collapse of the Bretton Woods
tight constraints are imposed on the monetary and fiscal relatively low uncertainty pressures) rather than smooth and orderly events. agreement in 1973.
authorities, who can follow, if they so decide,  policies
that are inconsistent with preserving the parity. 
- Adjustments of the parity (devaluations) are a powerful of need) provides the system with some problems embedded in  the system could be 1993-93, Thailand, 1997), if not de jure.   
policy instrument. flexibility. attenuated.
-The built-in “escape clause” (which -If supplemented by the right institutions (e.g., an -Many emerging countries continue to
allows the authorities to devalue in case independent central bank) the time inconsistency subscribe to this system de facto (e.g., Mexico
8.  Currency board  -Strict fixed exchange rate system, with institutional -The system maximizes credibility and - The system is long on credibility but short on -Historically, a number of small  countries have
(legal, and even constitutional) constraints on monetary reduces (eliminates)  problems of “time flexibility.  Large external shocks cannot be had systems of this type. Some of them,
policy and no scope for altering the parity.  inconsistency” . accommodated through exchange rate changes but however, have not been successful.  When faced
- The monetary authority only can issue domestic money
when it is fully backed by inflows of  foreign exchange.
have to be fully absorbed by changes in with major external shocks, countries have
unemployment and economic activity.   been forced to abandon the regime. 
- The central bank loses its role as lender of last -Currently, Hong Kong and Estonia have
resort. currency boards. Argentina and Bulgaria have
(quasi)-currency boards arrangements.
9.  Full ‘dollarization’ -Generic name given to an extreme form of a currency  -Credibility is maximized under this -As in the currency board, the system is  long on There are few historical episodes of full
board system where the country gives up completely its regime. Monetary authorities have, in credibility but short on flexibility. Adverse dollarization.  A regime similar to this has
monetary autonomy by adopting another country’s theory, no scope for “surprising” the external shocks have to be absorbed fully by the worked relatively well in Panama. However,
currency. public.   real economy.  the case of  Liberia unmasked a serious
-The central bank loses its role as lender of last
resort.
-A non trivial  shortcoming of this system is that it
is usually resisted on political and nationalistic
grounds. Another one, is that the rules of the game
can be changed under extreme circumstances.
shortcoming of this type of system: when faced
with an emergency (civil war) politicians
decided to change the rules of the game and
issued a national currency.  8
II.1 The Shift Away from Currency Pegs
Since the late 1970s single currency pegs have become increasingly less common among
developing countries.  This feature of the recent evolution of the international monetary system has been
amply documented and discussed in the exchange rate literature. The standard way of illustrating this
gradual shift toward more flexible exchange regimes by LDCs has been to trace the evolution over time of
the official exchange rate arrangements that countries are obliged to report to the IMF.  Table 2 (taken
from IMF, 1997) is a typical example; the table shows a steady fall over the past two decades in the
number of developing countries that maintain some type of pegged exchange rates, and a concomitant rise
in the number of countries with “more flexible” exchange rate regimes.
At least two broad explanations have been offered to account for this trend toward greater
exchange rate flexibility.  One explanation is that starting in the late 1970s a confluence of factors of external
and domestic origin prompted developing countries to rely more heavily on exchange rate changes as part
of their process of macroeconomic adjustment.  Those factors obviously vary from country to country (and
from region-to-region) but are typically thought to include the large exchange rate fluctuations among major
currencies that followed the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the oil shocks of the 1970s and
1980s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, and, especially in Latin America, fiscally-driven bouts of  high and
chronic inflation.  A key premise underlying this explanation is that exchange rate changes can (and should)
play a central role in restoring and preserving external and domestic equilibrium in shock-prone developing
countries (see, for example, the discussion in Corden, 1990, Aghevli et al., 1991, and Little et al., 1993).9
Table 2. Developing Countries: Officially Reported Exchange Rate Arrangements
(In percent of total)
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
Pegged 86 75 67 57 45
  U.S. dollar 42 32 25 19 15
  French franc 13 12 11 11 11
  Other 7 4 4 3 4
  SDR 12 13 8 5 2
  Composite 12 14 18 20 14
Limited flexibility 3 10 5 4 3
   Single 3 10 5 4 3
   Cooperative — — — — —
More flexible 11 15 28 39 52
   Set to indicators 6 3 4 4 2
   Managed floating 4 9 13 16 21
   Independently floating 1 4 11 19 29
Number of countries 100 113 119 123 123
Source: IMF, 1997.10
An alternative view that has gained prominence in recent years stresses the inherent tensions
that arguably exist between high capital mobility and fixed exchange rates.  According to this view, the
main factors behind the marked shift away from single currency pegs in developing countries have been
the dramatic increase in the degree of capital mobility experienced by these economies over the last two
decades, and the ensuing rise in the (output) costs of preserving and defending a fixed exchange rate
system--which is seen as a key determinant of recent episodes of “currency crashes” (see, for instance,
Eichengreen, 1994, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995a, and Leiderman and Bufman, 1996).
Both of these explanations receive some support from a number of recent studies that examine
the factors behind the developing countries’ shift toward more flexible exchange rate arrangements from
a political economy perspective--see Collins, 1996, Edwards, 1996, and Klein and Marion, 1997.  An
important insight emphasized by these studies is that the switch from traditional currency pegs to “more
flexible” arrangements has had the effect of lowering the (perceived and actual) political cost of
exchange rate changes that is normally borne by the authorities.  By “de-politicizing” exchange rate
movements, the argument goes, the authorities of these countries have become better equipped to
respond “flexibly” to any given shock--including those that stem from international capital markets--
even though, or perhaps precisely because, the switch rarely has entailed the adoption of freely floating
exchange rates and, thus, nominal exchange rates in these countries have remained under heavy
administrative control (Collins, 1996).
Regardless of the relative merits of the explanations put forward thus far, the marked shift away
from fixed exchange rates by developing countries has provided the opportunity to gather evidence on
the actual effects of alternative nominal exchange rate regimes on the macroeconomic performance of11
these economies.  Of course, this option was not available under the Bretton Woods system (where all
countries, developing or not, were required to maintain some type of currency peg), and only became a
feasible one as the shift toward more flexible exchange rate arrangements and current account
convertibility gained momentum sometime during the 1980s (Table 2).
II.2 Exchange Rate Regimes and Macroeconomic Performance:  Facts and Fantasies
II.2.1 Individual Country Studies
For a number of years, the bulk of the evidence on the relationship between nominal exchange
rate regimes and macroeconomic performance in LDCs stemmed from largely descriptive accounts and
assessments of experiences and experiments of individual countries (or groups of countries) with
various types of exchange rate arrangements. Two well-known examples of this approach are the
numerous studies that examined the demise of the infamous “tablitas” adopted by Argentina, Chile and
Uruguay in the late 1970s (for an overview of these episodes see Calvo, 1986, Corbo and de Melo,
1987, and Edwards, 1985, 1986), and, years later, the evaluations of the (few) experiences with
crawling exchange rate bands -- a distant cousin of target zones -- in the developing world (e.g.,
Helpman et al., 1994, Williamson, 1996). Findings reported in some multi-country comparative studies
sponsored by, or conducted at, the World Bank--notably those of Choksi et al., 1989 and Little et al.,
1993--also added to the profession’s collective understanding of the relationship between exchange
rate regimes and macroeconomic performance in developing countries .
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Not surprisingly, this country-specific literature found it very difficult to pin down the
independent effects of the nominal exchange rate regime on the overall macro performance of
developing countries.  Every time the profession seemed to be reaching agreement on a feature or12
regularity distinctive of a particular regime based on analyses of the experience of a group of countries,
developments in another group of countries provided a devastating counter-example that needed to be
reckoned with.  The clearest conclusion that this literature seemed capable of reaching was that the
nominal exchange rate regime provided no substitute for sound and consistent macroeconomic policies. 
In fact, since the early 1990s it has become customary to end every study on exchange rates in
developing countries by stressing that both fixed and flexible exchange rates “can work” in those
economies, provided that policy-makers show a sufficiently strong commitment to macroeconomic
stability.  Of course all of this is true, but trite.
II.2.2 Multi Country Studies
As the diversity of experiences increased during the 1970s, and especially during the 1980s,
researchers were able to use larger samples -- both in terms of countries and years -- to evaluate
performance under alternative exchange rate systems.  Edwards, 1993, for example, used a sample of
52 developing countries to investigate whether a fixed exchange rate regime indeed delivered lower
rates of inflation than more flexible regimes.  Edwards noted that this type of cross-country analysis was
potentially subject to a serious “survival bias.”  The problem is that only countries that have successfully
defended their peg are included in the “fixed exchange rate” category.  On the other hand, countries
that adopted a fixed exchange rate, but failed to sustain it, are usually classified as having a “flexible
regime.”  This means that high inflation rates generated by exchange rate “crashes” are incorrectly (or
unfairly) attributed to the flexible rate system.  This problem had been noted also by Aghevli, et al.,
1991 who, after arguing that “the inflation performance of the countries that have operated under a
fixed exchange rate regime has been, on the whole, superior to that of the group operating under more13
flexible arrangements,” added that this type of conclusion “neglects the experience of countries that
initially adopted a pegged arrangement, but were forced to abandon it” (page 13).   Edwards, 1993
attempted to address this survival bias by examining whether, after controlling for other variables,
countries that had a fixed exchange rate during the first year (1980) of a ten-year period (1980-89) had
a lower average rate of inflation for the decade as a whole.  He found that countries with a fixed
exchange rate indeed experienced a lower average rate of inflation (the regression coefficient of the
dummy variable for a fixed exchange rate in 1980 was -0.7).  This effect, however, seemed to depend
on the country’s inflation history: the inclusion of an interactive regression term suggested that at levels
of past (historical) inflation equal to or higher than 20 percent, fixed exchange rates lost their
macroeconomic discipline effect.
Little, Corden, Cooper and Rajapatirana, 1993 also investigated whether fixed exchange rates
discouraged inflation in their comprehensive study of experiences with macroeconomic adjustment in a
group of 18 developing countries.  Although they recognized the “reverse causality” problem, they
conducted their analysis at a simple descriptive level, without making a formal attempt at dealing with
the problem.  After looking at the data from different angles they came to the perhaps obvious but
nonetheless valuable conclusion that it was not possible to make generalizations.  While in some
countries a fixed exchange rate had been associated with a lower rate of inflation, in other “episodes the
exchange rate was clearly not an effective ‘nominal anchor’” (page 245).  In addition, they made the
important point that all analyses of country performance under alternative exchange rate regimes, should
take into account the role of capital mobility.  In fact, they suggested that their conclusions were most
relevant for countries where the degree of capital mobility was somewhat limited. 14
One of the most comprehensive multi-country studies to date was conducted by Ghosh et al.,
1995.  The study examines the effects of the nominal exchange rate regime on inflation and growth using
data from 136 countries during the period 1960-89--more than 3,600 annual observations.  The
authors compute unconditional and conditional means for the rates of inflation and output growth in the
countries in the sample grouped and classified according to the degree of flexibility of their nominal
exchange rate, as well as by their level of income.  The conditional means are obtained from OLS
estimates of simple equations for inflation and growth that include as regressors an exchange rate regime
dummy and a set of other potential determinants.  The authors check whether (a subset of) their results
suffer from a problem of “reverse causation” (simultaneity bias), and also examine the effects that the
regime may have on the volatility of inflation and output growth.
The study finds that the inflation rate is indeed significantly lower and less volatile under
pegged exchange rates than under “more flexible” arrangements, even after controlling for the effects of
money growth and interest rates.  When it comes to output growth, however, the study finds little
systematic differences across exchange rate regimes, except for the fact that output growth (and
employment) are found to be more volatile under pegged exchange rates than under flexible rates. 
Another interesting finding of the study is that the “inflation bias” of flexible exchange rate arrangements
does not seem to be present among the “pure floaters” in the sample--especially among the high- and
upper-middle-income ones; a result that suggests that the positive correlation between exchange rate
flexibility and inflation detected in the study may not be monotonic.
A more recent IMF study that extends the period of analysis to the mid-1990s reports similar
findings: over the past two decades, inflation has been consistently lower and less volatile in developing15
countries with pegged exchange rates than in those with more flexible arrangements, but there are no
clear differences in the growth performance across the two groups (IMF, 1997).  Although those
conclusions are based on rather crude comparisons of the evolution of the median rates of inflation and
output growth in countries with “pegged” and “flexible” exchange rate arrangements from 1975 to
1996, the evidence presented in this study suggests that the main findings reported by Ghosh et al.,
1995 were not greatly affected by the increased access to international capital markets gained by
developing countries in the 1990s.  Indeed, it appears that the differences in macroeconomic
performance across nominal exchange rate regimes in developing countries continue to boil down to
differences in the inflation performance of the countries in each group, and that those differences seem
to be getting smaller over time.
The apparent superiority of fixed exchange rates for delivering lower and more stable rates of
inflation in developing countries is tempered even further when one takes into account the
methodological compromises that are common--and oftentimes unavoidable--in cross-country 
comparisons of nominal exchange rate regimes.   First of all, the majority of studies classify nominal
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exchange rate regimes following the countries’ official description of their exchange rate system
(typically the one they report to the IMF) rather than on the basis of the actual degree of flexibility of
their nominal exchange rates.  Discrepancies between de jure and de facto (performance-based)
classification of regimes, however, are often substantial; moreover, the sign and size of those
discrepancies vary across countries and over time.  Furthermore, to make things tractable, studies have
to condense the 20-odd de jure categories of exchange rate arrangements reported in IMF sources16
into two or three broad types of regime (e.g., “pegged” and “flexible”), which can lead to important
differences in the classification of the same regime across studies .
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Second, and as pointed out above, many of these studies implicitly assume that all exchange
rate regimes in their sample were sustainable (in the sense of being consistent with other
macroeconomic policies) and that all changes in regime (often, though not always, in the direction of
greater exchange rate flexibility) were voluntary.  A consequence of this assumption is that the
macroeconomic effects of all “regime switches” tend to be ascribed to the successor regime; in
developing countries, however, changes in the exchange rate regime are rarely smooth events, and tend
to have short-run adverse effects on inflation and output, especially when they involve a large
devaluation (Edwards, 1989, Edwards and Montiel, 1989, Eichengreen and Masson, 1998). Another
consequence is that the duration of the exchange rate regime is assumed to be immaterial for
macroeconomic performance.  Thus, for instance, observations corresponding to countries that
somehow managed to hold on for a year or two to clearly inconsistent and unsustainable currency pegs
are, for the purpose of the tests conducted in the studies, treated no different by observations pertaining
to currency pegs that have been in place for several decades (e.g., the countries in the CFA zone).
And third, there is the longstanding and earlier noted problem of endogeneity of the choice of
exchange rate regime or “reverse causation.”  The key question is whether fixed exchange rates deliver
low inflation by adding discipline and credibility to the conduct of macroeconomic policies.  Or is it that
countries with low inflation choose pegged exchange rates, perhaps to signal their intention to maintain
their anti-inflationary stance?  A similar problem arises in the case of output growth, despite the
difficulties of empirical studies for finding any clear link between growth and the exchange rate regime. 17
Do fixed exchange rates foster economic growth--say, by delivering an environment of low inflation and
low relative price variability?  Or do fast-growing countries choose fixed exchange rates so as to further
reduce relative price variability and, hence, increase the horizon and efficiency of investment decisions? 
Of course, these questions have been at the core of the debate between fixed and flexible exchange
rates since the beginning.  However, the expectation that more systematic analyses of the empirical
evidence could shed more light on them than what could be asked from analyses of individual country
experiences may have been too optimistic.  Although some recent studies (notably those of Ghosh et
al., 1995 and Edwards, 1993, 1996) have made serious attempts to control or check for a possible
simultaneity bias in their estimates stemming from an endogenous choice of exchange rate regime, the
above noted problems in the classification of those regimes and in the treatment of “regime switches”
are just two of many possible sources of sample selection bias that remain largely unaddressed.  All
considered, it seems that a satisfactory solution to the “reverse causation” problem in studies of the
relationship between exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic performance in developing countries
will require, at a minimum, many more, longer, and better defined episodes of fixed and flexible
exchange rates in those economies than what is currently available.
II.3 What We Need to Know
A key message of the foregoing discussion is that what the literature on exchange rate regimes
in developing countries calls “flexible exchange rates” are, in reality, quite a mixed bag. The problem
goes beyond the known but often downplayed fact that the great majority of nominal exchange rates
considered “flexible” in empirical studies were--and in some cases remain--heavily managed and/or
directly set by the authorities, and, hence, that groupings based on de jure classifications of regimes will18
tend to exaggerate the shift towards exchange rate flexibility in those economies.  It has to do also with
the difficulties (some would say futility) of trying to capture the independent effects of exchange rate
regimes on macroeconomic performance using data and techniques that are not up to the task.  For
example, empirical studies will often lump together in the “flexible exchange rate” category countries
with nominal exchange rates that are as stable as de jure pegs (i.e., the case of many East Asian
countries in the years before the 1997 crises), as well as countries undergoing high inflation, where
exchange rates can do little else than move more or less in tandem with the other nominal variables of
the economy (e.g., most Latin American countries in the 1980s).  But there can be no presumption that
the biases that these various subgroups of countries will impart to the average indicators of
performance of the “flexible” category will be mutually offsetting and/or time invariant.  Cross-regime
comparisons of performance that rely on those average indicators are therefore likely to remain
seriously flawed.
A corollary of the above is that the extensive literature on exchange rate regimes in developing
countries does not really have much to offer when it comes to define and characterize a “flexible”
exchange rate. What does nominal exchange rate flexibility entail in practice? What is it supposed to
accomplish? And over what horizon?  These are some of the important questions for which the
literature on the subject has yet to provide even approximate answers.  The evidence available does not
shed much light either on whether floating exchange rates represent a feasible or desirable option for
developing countries.  Most of what has been said about this falls somewhere between a priori
theorizing and sheer speculation.  To our knowledge, there have been no serious attempts at
establishing an economically-based divide between a “flexible” and a “floating” exchange rate in19
developing countries.  Moreover, given the dearth of episodes with floating exchange rates in those
economies , it is not entirely clear whether such a distinction is even possible and, therefore, what
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countries or experiences outside the developing world should provide the yardstick for evaluating this
option.
The current state of affairs is, in many ways, unsatisfactory.  The newly emerging consensus on
the gains that developing countries will reap from moving toward “more flexible” exchange rate regimes
and on the imminent extinction of the middle-of-the-road exchange rate arrangements of the fixed-but-
adjustable variety (Eichengreen, 1994, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995a) looks less persuasive when one
tries to pin down the notion of exchange rate flexibility that underlies those conclusions.  Nonetheless, it
seems that the case for greater flexibility has received a further boost from the recent currency crises in
Mexico, East Asia and, now, Russia.  A perusal of the rapidly expanding literature on the origins and
(short-run) consequences of those “currency crashes” reveals that the calls for greater exchange rate
flexibility come in fact from two different camps: (I) those who continue to ascribe a key role to the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor of the economy and, thus, see the increased flexibility as consistent
with some form of nominal exchange rate targeting (IMF, 1997, Eichengreen and Masson, 1998) and
(ii) those who stress the perils of relying on an asset price (the exchange rate) as a nominal anchor or a
source of monetary policy credibility in a world of expanding global capital markets (Obstfeld, 1995,
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995a).  Of course, as is typical in exchange rate matters, there is also an
influential group of dissenters who extract the exact opposite conclusions from the recent crises and
argue that the time is ripe for a generalized adoption of currency board-type arrangements by20
developing countries and/or for the return to some type of gold (dollar) standard for the world as a
whole (e.g., Dornbusch, 1998, McKinnon, 1998).
The debate is up for grabs, and probably would be difficult to settle solely on the basis of
further (and better) evidence on the relationship between nominal exchange rate regimes and aggregate
macroeconomic outcomes (i.e., inflation and growth).  Better theoretical models of regime choice and
exchange rate determination in LDCs will of course help, but, at least in the near term, we think that the
most pressing questions will remain empirical in nature.  Take for example the need to give a more
precise operational meaning to the concept of exchange rate flexibility that is “appropriate” for
developing countries.  We would argue that the differences between the two broad camps identified
above lie on their differing views regarding three key features of exchange rate policy in a context of
high capital mobility: (1) the scope for (and effectiveness of) sterilized and unsterilized intervention as a
means for attaining (and preserving) a degree of nominal exchange rate stability; (2) the costs that
“excessive” fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate may impose on the economy’s performance; and
(3) the time dimension of their analysis--i.e., the horizon over which monetary policy, the exchange
rate, capital flows and the rest of the economy are assumed to interplay.  All of these are empirical
issues for which little, if anything, is known for the case of developing countries--not even for the
relatively advanced ones.  Unless the discussion starts to focus on those type of questions, our
understanding of the effects of greater exchange rate flexibility on the economic performance of these
countries will remain as tentative and speculative as it is today. 
Mexico’s experience after the 1994 peso crisis provides an opportunity to gain some insights
on behavior of floating exchange rates in emerging economies.  Of course, it is not possible to extract21
general conclusions from a single episode, but in the absence of other experiences with anything that
resembles a floating rate, analyses of Mexico’s foray with exchange rate flexibility should prove very
useful.  One of the most commonly voiced objections to floating rates in developing nations is that they
will be “excessively” volatile--indeed much more than in advanced countries.   Figure 1 presents
6
weekly data on the nominal exchange rate of the Mexican peso vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar for the period
January 1992 through May 1998; the top panel depicts the nominal peso/dollar rate, while the bottom
panel presents the weekly rate of devaluation of the Mexican peso during that period.  In a recent
study, Edwards and Savastano, 1998, used high frequency data similar to that in Figure 1 to analyze the
behavior of the Mexican peso/U.S. dollar rate during the period January 1995-November 1997.  They
use a series of indicators to compare the volatility of the peso/dollar rate with that of the DM, Japanese
yen, British pound, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and New Zealand dollar/U.S. dollar rates, as
well as that of the French Franc/DM rate.  They showed that, with the exception of 1995, the peso had
not been “excessively” volatile.  More specifically, using a battery of indicators they found that the peso
was more volatile than the French franc, New Zealand, Australian and Canadian dollars, and less
volatile that the yen, DM and pound/dollar rates.  Interestingly enough, an extension of these
computations to the first five months of 1998 indicate that, in spite of all the turmoil in the emerging
markets, the peso/dollar rate still was not the most volatile of these nominal exchange rates!
A particularly interesting aspect of the Mexican experience during the 1996-97 period is that
the relative lack of volatility of the peso/dollar rate was not caused by direct central bank intervention in
the foreign exchange market.  In fact, during 1996-97, the Banco de Mexico did22
not sell reserves, and only bought them through an options mechanism that did not put undue pressure
on the exchange rate.  According to Edwards and Savastano, however, during this period the central
bank adopted a feedback rule for monetary policy that took into consideration the short-run behavior
of the nominal exchange rate.  More specifically, using weekly data they were able to identify a reaction
function that showed that the monetary authorities tightened liquidity (base money) below its
preestablished target when the peso lost value vis-a-vis the dollar, and eased liquidity when the peso
appreciated.  Although preliminary, and based on only a few months of the floating exchange rate
experiment, these results suggest that middle-income countries can have a reasonably well functioning
floating exchange rate system.  As more and more developing countries join Mexico in the “flexible”
rates camp, as we believe they will, it will be possible to expand on analysis of the Edwards and
Savastano type, and even begin to seriously examine evidence on macroeconomic performance under
alternative regimes.
III.  Long-Run Real Exchange Rate Behavior in Emerging Economies
The distinction between equilibrium and disequilibrium real exchange rates (RER) is at the core
of all empirical analyses of exchange rate behavior.  Among the various concepts of equilibrium RER
utilized in these analyses, those related to the theory of purchasing power parity (PPP), in its many
variants, have proven to be the most resilient.  Just a few years ago, this assertion would have seemed
totally unwarranted.  Models built upon (or consisting of) PPP-based definitions of the equilibrium
exchange rate performed poorly when confronted with data of the early years of the post-Bretton
Woods system of generalized floating among the major currencies (e.g., Frenkel, 1981, Adler and
Lehman, 1983, Meese and Rogoff, 1983a, 1983b).  PPP was therefore rapidly, and rightly,23
discredited--at least in academic circles--as a guide for assessing the behavior of the RER both in the
short and medium term.
More recently, however, the notion that PPP provides a meaningful benchmark for assessing
RER developments over the (very) long term has resurfaced, at least in the case of industrial countries. 
A number of excellent recent surveys on the subject explain this somewhat surprising revival of PPP as
the result of three related factors: “looser” interpretations of the PPP doctrine, longer data samples, and
better (and more powerful) empirical tests--see Breuer, 1994,  Froot and Rogoff, 1995, and Rogoff,
1996.   These studies further argue that the interplay of those factors has helped produce a body of
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evidence that exhibits a remarkable degree of conformity with four “stylized facts” of RER behavior in
advanced economies: (I) the hypothesis that the (bilateral) RER follows a random walk is strongly
rejected when tested over sufficiently long horizons--typically spanning 6 or 7 decades; (ii) RER series
exhibit strong, but slow, mean reversion properties--with most estimates of the half-life of PPP
deviations falling somewhere between 3 and 5 years; (iii) hypotheses about the existence of a long run
equilibrium relationship between the nominal exchange rate and relative (domestic and foreign) prices
are difficult to reject--especially when the tests do not impose restrictions of symmetry and/or
proportionality; and (iv) with the exception of the yen/dollar rate, there is no compelling evidence of 
“permanent” deviations from PPP that can be accounted for by other (structural) factors--i.e., the
Balassa-Samuelson effect is not borne out by the data (Froot and Rogoff, 1995, Rogoff, 1996).
It is not readily apparent which, if any, of the long-run regularities of the RER noted above also
hold in the case of developing countries.  However, this type of information could significantly enhance
(and even refocus completely) the myriad of analyses and discussions of equilibrium and disequilibrium24
RER that are conducted for emerging economies.  In particular, knowledge of the relative validity of
PPP as a (very) long-run benchmark for the equilibrium RER--or, equivalently, of the speed of
convergence to long-run PPP--could help refine the horizon for which standard assessments of RER
misalignment are most relevant.  The review of the evidence on the main features of RER behavior in
LDCs that we undertake below seeks to shed some light on that question.  It also sets the stage for the
critical evaluation of the literature on RER misalignment that we present in Section IV.
III.1  RER stationarity and other tests of PPP:  individual country studies
The body of empirical literature on PPP focused on developing countries is quite thin, both in
absolute terms and when compared to that available for industrial economies (Breuer, 1994).  This is
probably a consequence of the developing countries’ reluctance to adopt floating exchange rates
following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.  Indeed, the fact that the majority of these
countries held on for a while to fixed exchange rate arrangements--as well as to all forms of restrictions
on current and capital account transactions--made it both less pressing and less meaningful to use their
data to test models that relied upon (or consisted of) PPP-based notions of the equilibrium exchange
rate.
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The situation started to change in the late 1980s.  Since then, a growing number of studies has
examined the time series properties of RER in various developing countries, in many cases testing
explicitly for some version of PPP.  Table 3 contains basic information from 13 of those studies.  
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Specifically, the table contains information on the countries and time period covered by the studies, the
measures of exchange rates and (relative) prices they used, the type of test of PPP they conducted, the
precise PPP hypothesis they tested, and the results they obtained.  To classify the tests employed in the25
studies we followed the demarcation of the various stages of tests of PPP proposed by Breuer, 1994
and Froot and Rogoff, 1995, namely: simple tests of  PPP as the null hypothesis (“stage one” tests),
univariate tests of the time series properties of the RER series (“stage two” tests), and cointegrating
tests of PPP, both bivariate and trivariate (“stage three” tests).  Notice, however, that none of the
studies in the table reported results from “stage one” tests of PPP, probably because the numerous
flaws of those OLS-based tests were well known before any serious empirical research on RER in
developing countries was undertaken.
The table captures some interesting features of empirical studies of RER and PPP in emerging
economies.  First, in terms of coverage, there is far more evidence available for Latin American
economies than for developing countries in other parts of the world.  Of the thirteen studies summarized
in the table, eight focused solely or primarily on Latin American countries and the other three on East
Asian economies.  Only two studies (Edwards, 1989, and Bahmani-Oskooee, 1995) examined RER
data from (a few) developing countries in other regions of the world.  Second, the periods covered by
the studies are quite short.  The majority of studies conducted tests on data series that covered less than
30 years--and four of them did so on series that covered less than 15 years.  Only three studies (León
and Oliva, 1992, Liu, 1992 andTable 3.  Empirical Studies of PPP in Developing Countries
McNown &  Abeysinghe &         Leon &  Bahmani- Calvo-Reinhart Devereux &
Edwards  Wallace  Kok-Hong  Oliva Liu Gan -Oskooee & Vegh Coes Edwards Seabra    Connolly Montiel
(1989) (1989) (1992) (1992) (1992) (1994) (1995) (1995) (1995) (1995) (1995) (1996) (1997)
Sample
   No. of countries 32 4 1 12 9 5 22 3 1 4 11 4 5
   Region broad coverage Lat.Am & Israel East Asia Latin Latin America East Asia broad coverage Latin Latin America Latin America Latin America Latin America East Asia
America America
   Period covered 1965-85 1976-86 1975-90 1957-91 1948-89 1974-88 1971-90 1978-92 1964-91 1957-82 1970-89 1973-90 1960-94
     No. of years 21 11 15 35 42 15 20 15 27 25 20 18 35
   Data frequency quarterly monthly quarterly monthly quarterly monthly quarterly quarterly monthly quarterly quarterly quarterly annual
     No. of  observations [84] [89,126] [63] [402, 418] [120,170] [154,174] [80] [52] [324] [101] [78] [72] [35]
 Exchange rate and prices
   Price ratio:     CPI X X X X    X X X X
                          WPI X X X X X
                           Mixed  1/ X X X
   Exchange rate:  Bilateral US    X 2/ X     X  3/ X X X X X
                           Multilateral X X X X X X
 Type of test
 Univariate ("Stage 2") X X X X X X X X X X X
       DF, ADF X X X X X X X X X X X
       Phillips-Perron X X X X X
       Variance ratios X X X
        Other     Box-Pierce Q Ljung-Box Q Ljung-Box Q
   Bivariate ("Stage 3") X X X X
     Engle-Granger CI test
       DF, ADF X X X X
       Phillips-Perron X X
     Other ECM BVAR
   Trivariate ("Stage 3") X X
     Johansen-Juselius CI test X X




   of real exchange rate RW rejected  found in 2 cases found for US RW rejected  not tested not found found in 8 cases not found not found found in 3 cases not tested rejected in rejected
only levels
(19 of 32 cases) (when p: WPI) (when p: CPI) (11 of 12 cases) (PP test)   (1st diff     (exc.Singapore
stationary) )
of prices, exchange rate vector not tested found in 3 cases not tested not tested bivariate: 3 yes; 2 no not found not tested not tested not tested not tested bivariate: 8 yes not tested not tested
        (when p: WPI)   trivariate: 9 yes trivariate: 9 yes
Mean reversion slow (no formal not tested not tested strong; long not tested on another not tested slow (Bev- not tested not tested suggestive not tested not tested
test) run 4/ RER Nelson) evidence
 Symmetry (of  p & p*) imposed imposed imposed imposed found in few cases imposed imposed imposed imposed imposed imposed imposed imposed
 Proportionality (between p & e) imposed  no formal test imposed imposed bivariate: 2 cases no formal test imposed imposed imposed not applicable bivariate: 4 imposed imposed
6/ cases
    (apparent) trivariate: 4 cases  (not apparent) trivariate: 4 cases27
(Footnotes to Table 3)
1/ Ratio of foreign WPI to domestic CPI.
2/ Parallel market US dollar rate.
3/ Bilateral rates vis-à-vis US, UK, Germany, Japan and Malaysia.
4/ Less than 5 years in 5 cases; more than 5 years in 7 cases.
5/ Test applied to PPP ratio multiplied by tradables share in WPI.
6/ There were no changes in the nominal exchange rate during the sample period.28
Montiel, 1997) used data series that covered 35 years or more.  To overcome the “small sample
problem” all studies but one used either quarterly or monthly data to test their hypotheses; this
produced samples that ranged from 50 to 400 observations.  Third, studies relied a bit more heavily on
consumer price indices than on wholesale price indices to construct their measure of relative (domestic
to foreign) prices.  Three studies (Edwards, 1989, Seabra, 1995 and Devereux and Connolly, 1996)
used a measure of relative prices that combined both the CPI (domestic prices) and the WPI (foreign
prices).   Also, in striking contrast with empirical tests on PPP for industrial countries, only seven of the
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studies in the table used a bilateral exchange rate vis-a-vis a major currency (typically the U.S. dollar)
as the measure of the nominal exchange rate .  The other six used a multilateral (trade-weighted)
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indicator--what the IMF calls the “nominal effective exchange rate.”   Fourth, the majority of studies
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relied on some type of univariate (“stage two”) test to examine the main properties of the RER--and the
PPP hypothesis.  Only four of the thirteen studies (McNown and Wallace, 1989, Liu, 1992, Gan, 1994
and Seabra, 1995) conducted bivariate cointegrating (“stage three”) tests of PPP, and just two of those
four also tested PPP using trivariate cointegrating techniques.  And fifth, studies were generally unclear
about the precise PPP hypothesis that was being tested.  It could be argued, however, that the majority
of them were testing for some variant of absolute PPP (in most cases using a somewhat peculiar
measure of the foreign price level consisting of a weighted average of price levels in the country’s main
trading partners). Only three studies (León and Oliva, 1992, Edwards, 1995, and Seabra, 1995) made
it clear that they were testing the hypothesis of relative PPP.
An obvious consequence of the predominance of univariate (stage two) tests of PPP is that the
bulk of the findings obtained by the studies in Table 3 revolves around the stationarity of various29
measures of the RER.  By and large, the hypothesis that the RER is stationary in developing countries
(and, thus, that some form of  PPP condition holds in the long run) does not receive much support from
these studies.  In 40 out of 54 individual country tests of RER stationarity, the hypothesis that the RER
series contained (at least) one unit root could not be rejected.  Interestingly, however, the hypothesis
that the RER series followed a random walk did not fare much better.  In fact, Edwards, 1989 and
León and Oliva, 1992 tested the random walk hypothesis for a combined total of 44 series, and
rejected it in about 2/3 of the cases.
Results from the (few) studies that used cointegration tests were somewhat more supportive of
the PPP hypotheses.  The four studies that tested for bivariate cointegration between the nominal
exchange rate and the ratio of domestic to foreign prices found that the residuals of the estimated
regressions were stationary in about 50 percent of the cases (15 of 33).  The two studies that
conducted trivariate tests of cointegration (Liu, 1992 and Seabra, 1995) found even stronger evidence
of an equilibrium relationship between the exchange rate and domestic and foreign prices (18 of 20
cases).  Notably, all the support for PPP obtained from these stage-three tests stemmed from data on
Latin American countries; in fact, Gan, 1994 did not find evidence of cointegration between the
exchange rate and prices in any of the five East Asian countries in his sample.
A somewhat disappointing aspect of the studies in Table 3 is that they do not reveal much about
the mean reversion properties of the RER series they examined (and, hence, about the speed of
convergence to long-run PPP in those economies).  Only three studies conducted formal tests of mean
reversion--and found some evidence of its presence--and two others simply mentioned mean reversion
as a feature of the RER series they used when discussing their findings.  Lastly, again reflecting the30
predominance of stage-two tests, the majority of studies ended up imposing rather than testing the
restrictions of proportionality and symmetry on the coefficients of the price terms in the RER--or PPP--
equation (Breuer, 1994).
Seeing what the studies in Table 3 have to offer, one gets the distinct feeling that our knowledge
of the basic time series properties of RER in developing countries and, in particular, of the relevance of
PPP as a long-run benchmark for the equilibrium RER in these economies is fairly rudimentary.  The
most serious shortcoming is, without question, the low power of the tests (especially of stage-two tests)
to distinguish among alternative hypotheses in the short periods covered by the studies--a deficiency
that cannot be fixed by the common practice of increasing the number of observations through the use
of quarterly or monthly data (Froot and Rogoff, 1995, Oh, 1996).  But this is hardly the only problem. 
The over-representation of Latin America in the sample of developing countries examined in the studies,
the lack of clarity with regard to the variant of the PPP theory that is supposedly being tested, and the
dearth of empirical work aimed at testing a well-defined PPP hypothesis using cointegrating techniques,
both bivariate and trivariate, also contribute to the above feeling.  The pervasive and severe data
problems that one encounters in developing countries may well be at the root of these shortcomings,
and it is quite possible that for many countries this constraint will not disappear for many years.  But this
does not alter the basic conclusion that the evidence on RER stationarity and long-run PPP contained in
studies of individual developing countries does not enable us to discern which, if any, of the regularities
of the long-run RER that have been found for industrial economies are also applicable to (or relevant
for) the developing world.31
III.2  Other evidence: panel estimates and cross-country studies
Recent studies that use panel data from industrial and developing countries to examine various
hypotheses related to PPP (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1996, Oh, 1996, O’Connell, 1998) provide
additional insights on the time series properties of RER in emerging economies.  The studies represent
one of the two lines of work that emerged in the 1990s to enhance the power of conventional tests of
PPP (Rogoff, 1996).   They achieve this by taking advantage of the cross-country variation of the data
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on exchange rates and prices, while at the same time reducing the (potentially serious) bias introduced
by the many changes in the exchange rate regime that most countries undergo during periods of several
decades (Frankel and Rose, 1996).
The results from these studies are broadly supportive of PPP as a long run benchmark for the
RER.  In particular, the studies reject the hypothesis that the RER follows a random walk in the sample
as a whole, as well as in a wide array of sub-samples, and find estimates of convergence to PPP similar
to those obtained with long-run horizon data sets--i.e., PPP deviations with a half-life of about 3 to 5
years.  The link between these findings and the long run behavior of the RER in developing countries
follows directly from the composition of the sample, which is amply dominated by observations from
LDCs.   In fact, an important question is whether developing countries’ data may not be influencing
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“too much” the overall findings of the studies.  Possible sources of bias include the predominance of
monetary shocks in many high-inflation developing countries (Rogoff, 1996), the cross-sectional
dependence stemming from using the U.S. dollar as the base currency for all calculations (O’Connell,
1998), and the aggregation across (and frequent switches of) nominal exchange rate regimes within the
sample. While the influence of those factors is fairly apparent in many results reported in the studies32
(see, for example, tables 2 and 3 in Frankel and Rose, 1996 and Oh, 1996), the size of the bias that
they impart to the overall findings and, hence, the extent to which those findings can be deemed
representative of the behavior of the RER in developing countries remains unclear, and should be
addressed in future work.
Using a completely different methodology, a recent cross-country study by Goldfajn and
Valdés, 1996 represents a significant addition to the empirical literature on RER in emerging economies. 
The authors compile a large sample of monthly data from 93 countries during the period 1960-94
(more than 39,000 observations), and proceed to identify the main empirical regularities of episodes of
RER appreciation and the mechanisms that make those appreciations disappear--i.e., the forces that
explain the apparent mean reversion of real exchange rates.  The episodes of appreciation (or
overvaluation) are defined as one-sided, short- and medium-term departures of the actual from the
“equilibrium” RER.  Concretely, they are defined as the difference between the actual multilateral RER
and one of two proxies for the “equilibrium” RER: one obtained from a regression of the logarithm of
the RER on two time trends (linear and square), and the other from a regression that also includes as
explanatory variables three RER “fundamentals” (the terms of trade, government spending and
openness).   The authors assume, rather than test, that all the RER series are trend-stationary,
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stochastic processes that tend to revert to their mean, and, based on this central assumption, claim that
the residuals obtained from their two PPP-based equations for the equilibrium RER provide reasonable
boundaries for the “true” overvaluation of the domestic currency.
Goldfajn and Valdés combine their two regression-based estimates of overvaluation with
arbitrary thresholds for the “critical” degree of appreciation (which they assume falls somewhere33
between 15 and 35 percent) to identify the main regularities of episodes of RER appreciation in the 35
years covered in their sample.  Specifically they calculate, for different configurations of those key
parameters, the number of appreciation episodes, their average duration, and their distribution over 5-
year intervals and across different exchange rate regimes.  They find that, depending on the parameters
they use, their sample contains between 20 and 173 episodes of appreciation which, on average, last
between 1 and 2 years each; that the time profile of those episodes exhibits a pronounced asymmetry
(in the sense that their “build up” phase lasts almost twice as much as their reversal phase); that
episodes of appreciation have been more common in the second half of their sample (1980-94); and
that they have been much less likely to occur in regimes with (de jure) flexible or floating exchange
rates.
To identify the factors that explain the end of appreciation episodes, Goldfajn and Valdés then
calculate the contribution of changes in the nominal exchange rate and changes in relative (domestic and
foreign) prices to the actual depreciation of the RER that marks the end of those episodes.  What they
find is that in the majority of cases (between 50 and 70 percent, depending on the parameters used) the
appreciations were undone primarily, when not solely, by changes in the nominal exchange rate as
opposed to changes in inflation differentials.   Moreover, they show that the probability of undoing an
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appreciation without a nominal devaluation is inversely related to the size of the appreciation--i.e.,
changes in inflation differentials rarely suffice to make large appreciations disappear.  Lastly, the authors
construct transition matrices in order to examine the relationship between the size of the appreciation,
the probability of its reversal, and time.  They find evidence that this relationship is highly nonlinear. 
Specifically, they find that the probability of undoing a given appreciation is higher the longer the horizon34
considered, but that, when the horizon is kept fixed, there is a U-shaped relationship between the
probability of reversal and the size of the appreciation--i.e., as the size of the appreciation increases, the
forces that make the RER return to its equilibrium path through a real depreciation start to dominate. 
Goldfajn and Valdés claim that these findings are consistent with (and supportive of) the recent results
on mean reversion and long-run convergence to PPP that we have discussed earlier.  Although this
claim seems a bit of a stretch and, together with a few other conjectures and rough edges , deserves a
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fuller examination, on the whole we believe that the “stylized facts” documented in this study and
summarized above provide fertile ground for future research on the long-run regularities of RER
behavior in developing countries.
III.3  Structural deviations from PPP: the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
A wholly different strand of literature has aimed at documenting and explaining the existence of
“structural” (permanent) deviations from absolute PPP across countries.  Building on the seminal work
by Balassa, 1964, and drawing primarily on data sets constructed for the UN-sponsored International
Comparison Program (ICP),  numerous studies have provided evidence of sizable differences between
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a country’s exchange rate and its purchasing power parity (defined as the ratio of a country’s price level
to the price level in a reference country, the U.S., both constructed using the same set of weights for
individual commodity groups)  and have examined empirically what factors may account for the
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differences. 
Table 4 presents information for 15 of those studies.   The table shows clearly that up to the
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early 1990s the empirical approach followed by this strand of the literature consisted of estimating
cross-sectional regressions of some countries’ “real price level” (the PPP index defined above divided35
by the nominal exchange rate) or variants thereof (e.g., “real prices” for a subset of commodity groups
such as services or nontradables) on a relatively small number of explanatory variables, using samples
with a length and coverage that were largely dictated by the latest ICP data available.  The rationale for
including as regressors a measure of per-capita income jointly with proxies for various other “structural”
features of the economy (e.g., the share of primary sector output in total GDP, the openness ratio,
indicators of educational attainment) was threefold: test the robustness of Balassa’s findings, increase
the explanatory power of the regression equation, and ascertain the relative contribution of the
competing hypotheses that were being offered to explain large and sustained deviations from absolute
PPP, namely: productivity differentials between tradable and nontradable sectors (Balassa, 1964,
Samuelson, 1964), differences in relative factor endowments (Bhagwati, 1984, Kravis and Lipsey,
1983), differences in the degree of factor mobility (Clague, 1985), and/or differences in consumer
preferences (Bergstrand, 1991).
On the whole, the cross-country studies in Table 4 were far more successful in showing that the
direct relationship between “real price levels” and per-capita income found by Balassa was robust to
increases in the sample size, changes in the base year and inclusion of additional regressors than in their
other two objectives.  In particular, the goal of distinguishing among competing explanations for the
existence of such a link between real prices and income levels proved quite elusive (see Bergstrand,
1991 and Heston et al., 1994).  Also, there were indications that the results were not as strong when
the sample was confined to, or dominated by,36
          Table 4. Cross-sectional studies of PPP Deviations (Real Price Levels) 
Balassa Clague & Tanzi Isenman Salazar-Carrillo Kravis & Lipsey Kravis & Lipsey Kravis & Lipsey Clague
(1964) (1972) (1980) (1982) (1983) (1987) (1988) (1986)
Sample
  Cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes (3yr avges) yes (3yr avges) yes
  No. of countries 12 17-19 16 16, 22 16, 26, 34 25 44, 60 31
    o.w. developing countries 0 17-19 8 16 19 15 33 18
  Year(s) covered by data 1960 1960 1970 1973, 1970 1975, 1970 1975, (1960-83) 5/ 1980, (1960-84) 5/ 1975
  Source(s) of price data  1/ ICP (OECD) ECLA ICP  ICP, ECLA ICP ICP ICP ICP
Specification
  Dependent variable(s) 2/ PPP/e PPP/e e/PPP PPP/e PPP/e PPP/e PPP/e PPP/e
Pn/e; Pt/e Pn/e; Pt/e Pn/e; Pt/e
  No. of regressors 3/   Min 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 2
                                     Max 1 4 5 1 4 4 4 8
Per capita income  
       expected sign yes yes yes yes yes yes OECD: yes,: no
 LDCs: no
       statistical significance (?) yes yes 1 of 2 yes yes yes  no
  (Pseudo) dynamics no no no no      yes  4/      yes  4/      yes  6/ no
Heston, Nuxoll Connolly 
Clague Clague Officer Bergstrand Falvey & Gemmel & Summers & Devereaux Dollar
(1988 a) (1988 b) (1989) (1991) (1991) (1994) (1995) (1992)
Sample
  Cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes    no  (panel)  9/ no (panel) 10/
  No. of countries 19 59 31 21 52 16, 34, 61, 64 17 117
     o.w. developing countries 13 32 n.a. 9 49 n.a. 17 95
  Year(s) covered by data 1970 1980 1975 1975 1980 1970,1975,1980,1985 1960-85 1976-85
  Source(s) of data  1/ ICP ICP ICP ICP ICP ICP S&H (PWT) S&H (PWT)
Specification
  Dependent variable(s) 2/ PPP/e PPP/e PPP/e Pn/Pt  Pn,j/Pn,us  7/ Pt/Pn PPP/e PPP/e
Pn/Pt        Ps,j/Ps,us         Pt/PPP; Pn/PPP
  No. of regressors 3/   Min 1 2 2 1 7 1 13 1
                                     Max 4 6 5 3 8 1 14 6
  Per capita income  
       expected sign yes yes yes yes some most yes yes
       statistical significance yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
  (Pseudo) dynamics no no no no no     yes 8/ year dummies ?
1/ ICP: International Comparison Program. Country coverage increased over time (several "phases"). Latest phase: Penn World Tables Mark 5 (PWT5), Summers & Heston (1991)
2/ PPP/e: real price level; ratio of "purchasing power parities" to the official exchange rate. Purchasing power parity defined as the ratio of the national price level in country j to the national price level
in the US.
    Pn/e : US dollar price of nontradables in country j.
    Pt/e : US dollar price of tradables in country j.
    All price categories (Pn, Pt) derived from national accounts data compiled for the ICP .
3/ Excluding the intercept.
4/ Compares coefficients obtained from estimating the same equation using data for different periods (years).  Includes as   regressor
in the equation for period T, the residuals obtained in the estimation for period T-1  to assess the "persistence" of PPP deviations. 
5/ Annual price data for individual years (and 3-year averages) obtained by interpolation.
6/ Computes trend regressions for prices and per capita income, and gauges the relation between trend changes in those variables.
7/ Pn,j/Pn,us [Ps,j/Ps,us]: relative price of nontradables [services] in country j to nontradables [services] in the US.
8/ Compares per capita income coefficient obtained from estimating the same equation with data for different samples and periods.
9/ Six observations per country, each of them representing a 5-year period.
10/ Ten annual observations per country (from Penn World Tables Mark 4)37
observations from developing countries (Salazar-Carrillo, 1982, Kravis and Lipsey, 1988) but the data
constraints proved too severe to deal with this problem satisfactorily.
Findings of large and seemingly “structural” deviations from absolute PPP like those obtained
from the cross-country studies in Table 4 are essentially of a static nature and, hence, have only a
limited value as benchmarks for the medium- and long-run behavior of the real exchange rate in a given
country or group of countries.  That gap has to be filled with time series evidence and/or with more
systematic analyses of the origin (and duration) of those deviations from PPP, preferably using data not
taken from (or related to) the ICP.    For many OECD economies such analyses exist.   For
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developing countries, however, that type of  evidence is quite rare.
Wood (1991) was among the first (and few) to examine systematically the factors behind
“secular” movements in the real exchange rates of a large group of developing countries.  Using World
Bank data, measures of the real exchange rate and its “structural” determinants closely related to those
employed by the studies on the “real price level” in Table 4, and a peculiar empirical methodology
(wherein, for example, all variables were expressed in terms of the ratio of their average value in the
years 1980-84 to their average value in the years 1960-64), Wood’s study showed that from the early
1960s to the early 1980s the real exchange rates of LDCs had depreciated relative to those of
industrial countries by an amount that ranged from 20 to 40 percent, depending on the developing
countries’ level of income.  He then concluded, based on the results obtained from several cross-
country regressions, that the main cause for the common trend in the real exchange rates of LDCs
during those 25 years was “an unusually large trend increase in the price of nontraded to traded goods38
within the developed countries” (page 331)--i.e., a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect in the real
exchange rates of the industrial economies.
Isard and Symansky, 1996 followed a more conventional approach to examine the long run
movements in the real exchange rates of the countries that are members of APEC.   They constructed
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four measures of the bilateral RER (one based on ICP data and the other three consisting of exchange
rate-adjusted ratios of GDP deflators, consumer price indices and export price indices) and showed
that, from 1973 to 1993, only Japan, Korea and Taiwan experienced substantial real appreciations vis-
a-vis the U.S. dollar; most of the other fast-growing APEC countries experienced a depreciation of
their real exchange rate--which was particularly large in the cases of China and Indonesia.  Isard and
Symansky interpreted these results as prima-facie evidence of lack of robustness of the relationship
between output growth and real appreciation commonly associated with the Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis.
To identify the causes for the absence of a Balassa-Samuelson effect in the majority of APEC
countries, Isard and Symansky used national account data from the World Bank to decompose the
ratio of real GDP deflators (their preferred measure of the RER) into five “proximate determinants”: the
relative price of domestic and foreign tradable goods (proxied by the price of manufactures); the
domestic and foreign ratio of nontradable goods prices (proxied by the price of services) to tradable
goods prices; and the shares of nontradables in the domestic and foreign price indices.  They examined
the behavior of those “determinants” over the sample period, and computed their cumulative changes
from 1973 to 1993.  They found that the relative price of tradables “explained” rather well the year-to-
year variation of the RER in the majority of APEC countries, and accounted for the bulk of the trend39
changes in the real exchange rate in about half of the cases.  For the other half, they found that the trend
movements in the RER over the 20-year period had been driven by large changes in the relative price
of nontradable to tradable goods that were of the opposite sign from what the Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis would have predicted.  Isard and Symansky advanced three possible explanations for their
finding of trends in the relative price of tradable goods across APEC countries: changes in the
composition of tradable goods, changes in the terms of trade across different categories of tradable
goods and changes over time in the costs of “goods arbitrage”, but offered no formal test of these
conjectures.  Nonetheless, they claimed that their results provide a number of clear counter-examples
to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis among the APEC countries which, in their view, challenged the
presumption that fast-growing economies should generally be expected to experience sustained real
appreciations of their currencies.
All in all, a review of this literature makes it rather easy to fully endorse Rogoff’s, 1996 critique
of the empirical evidence on “structural” deviations from PPP and the Balassa-Samuelson effect for
OECD economies.  Support for the various hypotheses offered to explain “permanent” deviations from
absolute PPP is even weaker for the case of emerging economies and stems mostly from static
comparisons between rich and poor countries obtained from ICP-based data, rather than from analyses
focused on more homogeneous groups of LDCs or on long time series data for individual countries. 
The few studies that follow these alternative approaches (Wood, 1991, Isard and Symansky, 1996)
suffer from a number of shortcomings but nonetheless obtain results that cast further doubts about the
presence of a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect in developing countries during the last two to three
decades.  Until this evidence is refuted, we think that it would be prudent not to take for granted any40
assumption or conjecture about the relationship between output or income (growth) and real exchange
rates (changes) in emerging economies.
III.4  What We Need to Know
The main finding of this review of the literature on the long-run properties of real exchange rates
in emerging economies has been amply foreshadowed.  Briefly put, the evidence in support of various
hypotheses related to PPP is generally weaker for LDCs than for industrial countries; at the same time,
however, the evidence on “structural” deviations from PPP--the Balassa-Samuelson effect and related
hypotheses--is as flawed and inconclusive for developing countries as it is for industrial economies, with
the exception of Japan.  As  noted before, for the case of industrial countries a consensus has been
reached in recent years regarding the (approximate) answer to questions such as:  Does PPP hold in the
long run?  How long is the long run?  What is the half-life of PPP deviations? And, Which are the
effects of productivity differentials on the RER?   For developing countries, individually or as a group,
no such consensus exists.  Severe data problems have undoubtedly contributed to this outcome, but
other factors (such as the heavy concentration on Latin American experiences to the detriment of other
regions of the world) also have played a role.  In any event, the agenda is quite clear: we need to know
much more than we currently do about the long-run properties of real exchange rates in emerging
economies.
A better grasp of the long-run regularities of RER behavior in developing countries, and, in
particular, of the relative validity of PPP as a (very) long run benchmark for the real exchange rate,
would help give the appropriate time dimension to the assessments of RER misalignment that, as we
show in the following section, have become commonplace in emerging economies.  In this regard, it is41
important to stress that firmer evidence of long-run convergence to PPP in developing countries (say,
comparable to that available for industrial economies) need not be incompatible with the notion of a
time-varying equilibrium RER determined by the interplay of a set of foreign and domestic
“fundamentals,” nor would it make less pressing the need to improve the methods currently used to
assess RER misalignment in those countries.  Evidence of (slow) convergence to PPP would, at best,
provide support for an “ultra-long-run” concept of the equilibrium RER--i.e., the rate that would result
after all real and (transitory) nominal shocks have dissipated, a process that may take several decades
(Breuer, 1994).  The relevant yardstick for the medium to long run, however, will continue to be a time-
varying, fundamentals-driven RER consistent with the attainment of internal and external balance.  Some
notion of the horizon over which the equilibrating forces pertaining to each of these dynamic processes
should be expected to dominate the other one is precisely what is missing from our collective
understanding of RER behavior in developing countries.
IV. Assessing Real Exchange Rate Misalignment
Questions related to the appropriateness of real exchange rates have for a number of years
been at the center of discussions on emerging economies.  In particular, analysts have been interested in
understanding whether, at a given moment in time, a country’s RER is (roughly) in equilibrium, or if it is
facing a situation of misalignment. There are at least two reasons why these issues have become
increasingly prominent in recent times: first, persistent overvaluation is seen as providing a powerful
early warning for currency crises (Kaminsky et al., 1998, Merrill Lynch 1998).  And second, situations
of protracted or recurrent real exchange rate misalignment have been associated with lower economic
growth over the medium and long run.   
2442
Assessing whether a country’s RER is out of line with its long run equilibrium is not easy,
however.  In fact, attempts to construct misalignment indices have tended to be highly controversial in
both academic and policy circles.  First, as we argued in the preceding section, PPP-based models of
exchange rate misalignment are, more often than not, highly misleading in  short- and medium-term
horizons.  Second, the equilibrium RER is not an observable variable.   And third, more sophisticated
models are difficult to interpret and, many times, lack a minimal degree of robustness.  Mexico provides
a clear illustration of these problems.  When, in 1994, independent analysts argued that the peso had
become dangerously overvalued, the authorities replied that the strong real appreciation experienced by
the peso during the previous four years was fully justified by changes in “fundamentals.”  From there
they went on to argue emphatically that the substantial strengthening of the peso should not be a cause
for concern, and that there would be no crisis.  As it turned out, they were wrong.
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In this section we evaluate the empirical literature on real exchange rate misalignment. We begin
with a discussion of single equation models for evaluating long run RER sustainability.  We then review
an approach based on general equilibrium simulation models that has been associated with
Williamson’s, 1985 “fundamental equilibrium exchange rates” (FEER).  As in previous sections, we end
with the question: “Given what this literature has to offer, what do we need to know?”
IV.1 Single-Equation Models of Real Exchange Rate Misalignment
Most empirical approaches to assessing real exchange rate misalignment are based on small--
usually single equation--econometric models.  In these models the real exchange rate is defined as the
relative price of tradable to nontradable goods that, simultaneously, is compatible with the attainment of
internal and external equilibrium.  
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As a backdrop for those analyses many authors develop theoretical models
(representative agent, intertemporal frameworks, with price flexibility, perfect competition and rational
expectations have become the most popular ones), from which a reduced form for the equilibrium RER
is derived.   This reduced form relates the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate to a set of variables,
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called the RER “fundamentals.”  These “fundamentals” usually include the terms of trade, output growth
(or productivity differentials), the country’s openness to international trade, import tariffs and
government spending.  While some authors have tried to use a relatively large number of “fundamentals”
in their regression equations, others have restricted their analyses to a small number of variables. 
In this framework the RER is said to be “misaligned” if its actual value exhibits a (sustained)
departure from its long run equilibrium.  This situation can arise, for example, when there are changes in
fundamentals that trigger a change in the equilibrium RER, but that are not  reflected in changes in the
actual RER.  A different type of misalignment takes place when macroeconomic policies become
incompatible with maintaining internal and external equilibrium, and give rise to a sustained appreciation
of the actual RER.    From a theoretical standpoint, the concept of misalignment requires assuming that
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there exist institutional or other type of rigidities that prevent the RER from adjusting rapidly towards its
medium- to long-run equilibrium level.   
29
The majority of single equation models follow a four steps approach for assessing RER
misalignment.   In the first step, historical data are used to estimate a (reduced form) RER equation.  
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(1) RER = E a x  + , ,  t  i  it  t  44
where thex  ’s are the “fundamentals”, the a ’s are their corresponding regression coefficients, and , is   it i  t  
an error term.  Most recent studies that estimate equations like (1) have done so using cointegration
techniques. 
The second step usually (but not always) consists of computing “normal” or “sustainable” values
for the fundamentals.  This is typically done by decomposing the x  ’s into “permanent” and “transitory” it
components using various techniques, including the methodology suggested by Beveridge and Nelson,
1981.
 (2) x   = xp   + xt  ,   it   it   it 
where xp    and xt   are the permanent and transitory components of fundamental i in period t.  Baffes, it it
Elbadawi and O’Connell, 1997 have argued that because deficiencies in the data of many developing
countries make it problematic to apply the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, analysts should rely on
alternative procedures, including ex-ante (that is, judgment-based) estimates of the sustainable level of
the “fundamentals”.  
The third step consists of using the xp ’s--which are interpreted as the long-run sustainable it
values of the fundamentals, and the estimated regression coefficients â  to construct an “equilibrium” i 
path for the RER.
(3) RER* = E  â  xp  . t  i  it
An important property of equation (3) is that, in contrast with simple PPP-based calculations, it
generates an estimated equilibrium RER that does not have to be constant over time.  Indeed, to the
extent that there are changes in fundamentals, the estimated index of the equilibrium RER obtained from
equation (3) will vary through time.
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In the fourth, and final, step the degree of misalignment is computed as the difference, at any
moment in time, between the equilibrium and the actual (or observed) RER.
(4) MIS = RER* -  RER  . t  t
If  RER* >RER  , the model would suggest that the currency is overvalued; conversely,  t t
if  RER* <RER  , the model would indicate that the domestic currency is undervalued.  t  t
Table 5 presents information on 16 empirical studies that have used the single equation
approach to assess the extent of misalignment in a score of developing and transition economies.   The
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second column of the table indicates the countries and time period covered by each study; the third
column provides a list of the fundamentals; the fourth column describes the techniques used to calculate
the equilibrium RER;  and the last column contains some general comments about each study.  A
number of features emerge from this table.  First, the interest on assessments of RER misalignment has
gone well beyond academic circles, and has captured the attention of the multilateral institutions,
government agencies and the private sector.  Second, most studies have relied on cointegration
techniques to estimate the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.  Third, as noted, the studies have
used as regressors a wide variety of “fundamentals.”  However, almost all of them included as
regressors the terms of trade and a measure of net capital flows, and about half of the studies included
in their set of fundamentals measures of government spending, openness and output growth--i.e., the
determinants of the equilibrium RER typically suggested by variants of the “dependent economy
model.”  Fourth, the studies have followed very different approaches to decompose the RER
fundamentals into “permanent” and “transitory.”  For example, in their study on Chile, Soto and Valdés,
1998 use four alternative decomposition techniques; Warner, 1997, in contrast, did not attempt to46
decompose the fundamentals in his analysis of Mexico’s real exchange rate.  Fifth, whereas some
studies have tried to capture the short-run dynamics of RERs through the estimation of error-correction
models, or other type of dynamic specifications that allow nominal variables to play a role in explaining
the real exchange rate, other have concentrated exclusively on medium- to long-term “real”
determinants of the equilibrium RER.  And finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, the studies have
obtained all types of results concerning the degree and direction of RER misalignment across countries
and over time, and often have reached opposite conclusions in their ex-post assessments of
misalignment of a particular currency.  For example, Montiel’s 1997 estimates suggest that the Thai
baht was significantly overvalued from 1981 to 1987, and then again from 1992 to 1994, whereas the
model of Ades, 1996 shows that the baht was persistently undervalued from 1985 to 1993.  Similarly,
the estimates of Broner et al., 1997 suggest that the overvaluation of the Mexican peso that preceded
the 1994 crisis started around 1990, and those of Ades, 1996 that it had started even earlier, in 1988;
however, the results obtained by Warner, 1997 indicate that the peso was slightly undervalued until
mid-1993.
Figure 2 depicts estimates of the equilibrium and the actual real exchange rate for 24 countries
obtained from the Goldman-Sachs model developed by Ades, 1996.   The figure captures a number
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of interesting features.  For instance, the estimates from this model indicate quite clearly that the
Mexican peso was overvalued in the period prior to the 1994 crisis.  The same estimates show that
following the devaluation Mexico’s RER overshot its equilibrium level, but only for a brief period.  The
estimates of this model also suggest that since the third quarter of 1996 the currencies of all East Asian
countries were overvalued, albeit the size of their misalignment was rather small.  Table 5. Empirical Studies of Real Exchange Rate Misalignment in LDCs
AUTHOR COUNTRIES / PERIOD FUNDAMENTALS TECHNIQUE COMMENTS
Edwards (1989) Twelve countries  Terms of trade, capital flows, import tariffs, -Panel data; fixed-effect instrumental variables.  -Equilibrium RERs calculated
-Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, government spending, productivity -Dynamic adjustment equation that allows short-run -No attempt made to compute misalignment due to
Greece, India, Israel, Malaysia, differentials (trend), excess domestic credit,  effects of nominal variables, including the rate of “benchmark” problem.
Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, nominal devaluation.  devaluation. Long run RER only influenced by  “real”  -Compares estimated equilibrium RER with simple
Thailand, Yugoslavia fundamentals PPP extrapolations.
1962-84 permanent and transitory components of fundamentals
-Beveridge-Nelson technique used  to calculate
Cottani,  Cavallo and Khan (1990) Twenty -four countries, including: Terms of trade, openness (inverse), net -Pooled OLS estimation -Compute RER misalignment from three sources: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, capital flows, excess domestic credit,  GDP -Three-year moving average for some fundamentals as degree of openness,  sustainable capital inflows,
Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay, Cote growth, foreign inflation,  time trend. proxy for permanent component. and domestic credit creation (internal equilibrium).
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Mali. Somalia, -Composite measure of  RER misalignment used as
Sudan & Zambia regressor in equations of economic performance. 
1960-83
Ghura and Grennes (1993) Thirty-three countries from Terms of trade, capital inflows, openness -Instrumental  variables estimation of pooled time- - Compute three  measures of misalignment: one
Sub-Saharan Africa   (inverse), excess domestic credit, nominal series and cross section data; includes country specific based on excess money creation and excess
1970-87 third one based on  the black market premium.
devaluation, time trend. dummies ( fixed-effect). government borrowing; another one  based on a
measure of “ sustainable” capital inflows, and a
- Composite measures of RER misalignment used as
regressor in equations of economic performance.
Elbadawi (1994) Three countries Terms of trade, capital inflows, openness, -Cointegration and error correction models -Misalignment is calculated as the difference
-Chile, Ghana, and India government spending, import tariffs,  -Beveridge-Nelson technique used to calculate between the estimated “equilibrium” RER and the
1967-90 credit,  nominal devaluation.  five-year moving average. -RER assumed to be, on average, in equilibrium
productivity differentials (trend), domestic permanent component of some fundamentals; for others, actual RER.
during sample period.
Calvo, Reinhart and Végh (1995) Three countries Terms of trade, GDP per-capita, inflation tax. -Beveridge-Nelson technique to obtain permanent and -No estimate of equilibrium RER or of misalignment
-Brazil, Chile and Colombia transitory components of fundamentals. is provided.
1978-92 model.
(quarterly)
-Cointegration between permanent components of RER -Compare cyclical and permanent component of RER
and fundamentals and fundamentals with predictions of an optimizing 
Ades (1996) Twelve countries Long-run fundamentals: terms of trade,  -Cointegration -Compares estimates of  equilibrium RER with
-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, openness, capital inflows, government -Dynamic error correction model simple PPP extrapolations.
Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, The spending, foreign interest rate, technology -Exponential moving-average procedure to obtain -Stresses differences between long run and short
Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, South (trend). permanent and transitory components. run determinants of the equilibrium RER
Africa and Venezuela. Short-run determinants: transitory changes
1980:1-1996:4 (quarterly) relative to those abroad, risk premium, 
in  terms of trade,  monetary conditions
international reserves coverage
Soto (1996) Chile Terms of trade, government spending, capital -Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of fundamentals. -Tries to capture non-linear behavior of RER
1978:1-1994:4 differential. fundamentals.
(quarterly) -Misalignment is computed as the  percentage
inflows,  import tariffs, external debt, -Cointegration and error correction model. -Compares linear and non-linear models; concludes
financial distortion index, interest rate -Model of endogenous transition that linear models tend to over-react  to shocks to
difference between the actual and the equilibrium
RER Table 5 (Concluded). Empirical Studies of Real Exchange Rate Misalignment in LDCs
AUTHOR COUNTRIES / PERIOD FUNDAMENTALS TECHNIQUE COMMENTS
Montiel  (1997) Five countries Terms of trade, openness, government -Non-stationarity used as criterion to classify -Estimation procedure allows sum of residuals
-Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, spending, public investment, foreign “fundamentals” as permanent between actual and estimated RER to be different
Singapore and Thailand interest rate, foreign inflation, dependency -Cointegration (modified Johansen) from zero.
1960-94 and sub-samples using confidence intervals
ratio, time trend. -Error correction model -Compares estimated with actual RER over sample
Warner (1997) Mexico Crude oil price, government spending, -OLS, Stock and Watson. -Stresses the importance of capital flows for
1979:1-1997:1 ratio of  non-tradable to tradable prices, - Compares monetary model with “real” model;
(quarterly) capital account balance, relative money finds little improvement from the addition of 
import tariffs, interest rate on external debt,  -Cointegration (Johansen) determining the equilibrium RER.
supplies (Mexico vs US) , relative GDP “ monetary fundamentals”.
growth, interest rate differential.
Soto (1997) Chile Terms of trade, government spending, public -Three methods for decomposing permanent and -Defines a “benchmark” case by computing a three-
1960-97 (annual) import tariffs, interest rate differentials. Prescott and moving average. between permanent and temporary components of
1978-97 (quarterly) - Cointegration fundamentals.
1986-97: (monthly) - Error correction model
investment, TFP, capital inflows, openness, temporary components: Beveridge-Nelson, Hodrick- period moving average of normalized differences
Razin and Collins (1997) Ninety-three countries Terms of trade, long-term capital inflows, -Panel data; fixed effect. -Misalignment constructed as the difference
(Penn World Tables data) resource balance, growth of output per between the RER and the linear combination of
1975-92 Short run shock to output, absorption and
worker, excess money growth. variables that proxy a “flex-price” RER.
money supply.
Broner, Loayza and Lopez (1997) Seven Latin American countries Ratio of relative prices of non-tradable to -OLS, GLS, and Instrumental Variables. -Misalignment constructed as the difference
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, tradable goods (CPI/WPI);  net foreign -Gonzalo-Granger decomposition between actual RER and estimates from
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) and the assets.  - Cointegration (Johansen) cointegrating vector.
U.S.
1960-95
Elbadawi and Soto (1997) Seven countries Terms of trade, openness,  long run capital -Newbold’s version of Beveridge-Nelson technique. -Scale estimates of equilibrium RER  by a scoring
-Cote d’ Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mali , inflows, government spending,  public -Cointegration function, based on the distance of fundamentals to
India, Chile and Mexico investment, foreign interest rate, country -Phillips-Loretan’s error correction model. their sustainable level.
1960-93 equilibrium RER with forward RER projections.
risk -For Chile, they compare reduced form estimate of
Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) Six  transition economies Real aggregate producer wages, marginal -Error correction model. -Use three measures of RER: doubly deflated
-Croatia, the Czech and Slovak productivity in  tradable sector, -Fixed country effect in constant, and in constant and nominal exchange rate, ratio of nontraded to traded
Republics Hungary,  Poland, and unemployment, rate of exchange rate slope.  goods prices, and dollar wages.
Slovenia. appreciation, interest rate differentials.
1990-95
(Sample size varies depending on data
availability).
Baffes, Elbadawi and O’Connell (1997) Two countries Terms of trade, openness, resource balance, -Error correction model. -Both countries members of CFA zone.
-Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso. investment share, foreign price level. -Three step procedure: order of integration, estimation
(Engle-Granger, Johansen), calculation of equilibrium
RER using Beveridge-Nelson, 
Soto and Valdes (1998) Chile Terms of trade, productivity differentials -Three decomposition techniques: Beveridge-Nelson, -Use net foreign assets as proxy for terminal
1977:1-1997:4 net foreign assets, public absorption. - Cointegrated VARs into account “ supply” effects.
(quarterly) -No “benchmark” considerations.
between tradable and  non-tradable sector,  Hodrick-Prescott, and Gonzalo-Granger. condition on foreign indebtedness;  do not take49
In spite of its relative simplicity and popularity, the single equation approach sketched above is
subject to some important limitations that may, in specific historical circumstances, generate highly
misleading results.  For example, as noted above, many of the indices of RER misalignment calculated
in the studies presented in Table 5 suggest disequilibrium patterns that contradict each other or do not
conform with what historical and/or episodic analyses of the country (or countries) in question have
concluded.  Soto’s 1996 study of Chile’s RER behavior in the 1990s is a good example of this
problem: Soto’s estimates suggest that the Chilean peso was overvalued between 1987 and 1989, a
period when according to almost every scholar that has analyzed Chile’s recent economic history, the
RER was, in fact, substantially undervalued.  
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Another problem shared by most single equation-based assessments of RER misalignment in
Table 5 is that they do not take into account the large (short term) swings in RERs that take place in
periods immediately following large nominal devaluations.  From an econometric perspective, (large)
nominal devaluations generate a break in the time series similar to the one examined by Perron, 1989
for the case of the price of oil.  Those structural breaks will introduce a bias if the cointegrating equation
is estimated by methods that ignore the fact that many large RER jumps are induced by major nominal
disturbances unrelated to “real,” as opposed to macroeconomic, fundamentals. 
A third shortcoming is that by using residuals-based estimates of misalignment, most of these
single equation models assume that the RER has been, on average, in equilibrium during the estimation
period.  This, of course, needs not be the case.  It is perfectly possible to estimate a model covering a
period when the RER has been persistently overvalued or undervalued.  Nonetheless, in order for these
models to be operationally useful, they need to define, either implicitly or explicitly, an in-sample50
“benchmark” or “base period (year)” for the equilibrium RER.  On this issue, Edwards, 1989 pointed
out:  “It is important to notice that although these estimated series provide important information
regarding the behavior of equilibrium real exchange rates, they have a somewhat limited use in directly
computing RER misalignment.  The problem, of course, is that we have to “anchor” the actual RER at
some point in the past.  Only if we are willing to assume that the actual and equilibrium rate were equal
some x years back can we talk about RER misalignment (page 158).” Soto, 1997 and Elbadawi and
Soto, 1997 acknowledged this “benchmark” problem, and addressed it by adjusting the intercept of the
cointegration equation using a score function that assumes that the actual and equilibrium RERs coincide
when the cyclical components of the fundamentals are minimized.  Halpern and Wyplosz 1997 also
recognized this problem in their estimation of RER indices for a group of transition economies.
A fourth limitation of these models is that they are based on analytical frameworks that do not
incorporate explicitly the sources of rigidities, and thus do not provide convincing stories on why, in the
first place, the RER should ever be misaligned.  Future work on the subject, then, would benefit from
explicitly introducing (non tradable) price stickiness, and thus providing testable hypotheses on the
(potential) sources of RER misalignment.
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A fifth problem of the models summarized in Table 5 is that they do not establish a clear link
between the “equilibrium” real exchange rate and the current (or capital) account, nor do they specify a
direct relationship between the estimated RER* and measures of internal equilibrium, including the level
of unemployment. This lack of formal connection between RER* and external and internal equilibrium
represents, in fact, a violation of the definition of RER used in the theoretical models employed to derive
the empirical RER equation.51
Sixth, the majority of these models use regression specifications that concentrate on “flow”
variables, hence ignoring the role of stocks, such as the international (net) portfolio demand for the
country’s assets.  Even studies such as those of Soto and Valdes, 1998 and Broner et al., 1997, which
have explicitly tried to incorporate both stock and flow considerations in their theoretical discussions,
suffer from this shortcoming.
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Finally, and related to the above, because they rely on historical data from each country to
construct the permanent and transitory components of the fundamentals, studies based on this approach
run the risk of missing some important changes in the equilibrium RER.  Consider, for example, the case
of a country that, for some reason (say, because it has undertaken a successful reform program)
experiences an easing of its external credit constraint towards the end of the estimation period.  In this
case, the country will be able to “sustain” an equilibrium net foreign assets ratio (and a RER*) that is
larger (lower) than what would have been observed during the sample period.
Not every study on real exchange rates--not even all those included in Table 5--has aimed at
assessing whether the actual RER in a country or group of countries is in line with its long run
equilibrium.  In fact, a number of studies have calculated indices of real exchange rate misalignment as
an intermediate step in analyses of economic performance, or currency crises.   Edwards 1988a, for
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example, used a misalignment index constructed with panel data for 12 countries to analyze the effect of
RER misalignment on economic growth.  Dollar, 1992 used deviations from a PPP-based RER
equation as a generated regressor in his analysis of growth in a score of countries, and many others
(Cottani et al., 1990, Ghura and Grennes, 1993, Razin and Collins, 1997) computed misalignment52
indices to include them as regressors in their analyses of the determinants of growth in developing
countries.
IV.2 General Equilibrium Simulation Models
In an effort to capture the complex interactions between different variables, some authors
(notably Williamson, 1985, 1991) have built general equilibrium simulation models (GESM) to analyze
real exchange rate behavior. These models define the equilibrium RER--oftentimes called the
Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER)-- as the relative price of tradables to non tradables
compatible with the achievement of internal and external equilibrium.  The former is defined as a
situation where output is equal to potential output, while the latter is “defined in terms of a sustainable
level of the current account” (Bayoumi et al., 1994,  page 23).  
In a recent review of RER misalignment analyses for the G-3 countries, Clark and MacDonald,
1998 have characterized the basic GESM model by the following set of equations:
(5) CA = - KA, 
(6) CA = b +b  q  + b y   + b  y  = - KA* 0  1 2   d 3 f
(7) FEER = ( -KA* - b - b y   - b  y ) / b , 0  2   d 3 f 1
Where CA is the current account; KA* is the exogenously given equilibrium capital account; q is the
real exchange rate; and y  and y are domestic and foreign aggregate demand levels compatible with full d f
employment (or internal equilibrium).  Equation (7) determines the equilibrium RER as a function of the
exogenous capital account and of domestic and foreign aggregate demands.  In this setting the more
traditional “fundamentals”, such as terms of trade, government spending and import tariffs, play a role
only to the extent that they affect KA*, y  or y.     d f53
Although the model represented by equations (5)-(7) is a highly simplified version of the GESM
approach, it does capture some important features of most efforts in that tradition.  First, the sustainable
level of the capital account is determined exogenously.  In most practical applications the researcher
chooses a value for K* on the basis of historical evidence.  This means that, as in the case of the single
equation models, many GESM models require defining some type of  “base period” (year) linked to the
country’s past experience.  And second, most GESM models are largely based on flow considerations,
and say little about the stock demand for net foreign assets, or the evolution of capital flows over time.
Dejavaran, 1996 developed a small GESM to assess the degree of RER misalignment in
Africa’s CFA Franc zone in the early 1990s.  In this model the equilibrium RER is defined as the rate
“which is consistent with a particular current account target” (page 6), and depends, fundamentally, on
the terms of trade.  The analysis starts by defining a base year in which the current account, and thus the
RER, were in equilibrium in each of the twelve CFA countries.  Next, the divergence between this
backward-looking “equilibrium” current account and the actual current account at the moment of the
evaluation is calculated.  Finally, the change in the RER required to restore current account equilibrium
is computed under a set of assumptions regarding a number of relevant elasticities.  Dejavaran then
extends this simple model to the case where there are changes in the sustainable level of capital flows,
and in import tariffs.  His results suggest that by early 1993, the RER was overvalued in eleven of the
twelve CFA countries; the only exception being Chad.   
In many ways Dejavaran’s model is an extension of the basic elasticities approach, and its
appeal resides on its simplicity.  On the other hand, it has a number of shortcomings that seriously limits
its wider applicability.  First, as Dejavaran himself recognizes, the results are highly sensitive to the54
choice of the base year.  In the case of Benin, for example, if 1981 is chosen as the base year, the
calculations indicate an undervaluation of 22 percent if, on the other hand, 1984 is the base year the
calculations suggest an overvaluation in excess of 10 percent!  Second, as in most GESM analyses
this model ignores stocks considerations and concentrates exclusively on the role of flows. It should be
noted, however, that although ignoring asset equilibrium may generate misleading results, the ensuing
bias is likely to be relatively small in countries with limited access to international capital markets (as is
the case of most African nations, which continue to rely almost exclusively on official capital flows).
In an ambitious undertaking, Serven and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1996 developed a dynamic general
equilibrium model to analyze the behavior of the RER in Chile.  Although their main interest was to
identify and understand the effects of fiscal policy on the real exchange rate, their model is general
enough to address a battery of policy questions, including assessing whether a country’s RER is in
equilibrium.  The model considers an economy that produces one good, which is an imperfect substitute
for foreign goods, and can be consumed domestically or exported.  There are four assets, and a
fraction of consumers is subject to a borrowing constraint.   Due to the existence of rigidities, labor
markets do not clear and there is unemployment.  Agents have rational expectations, and government
spending falls entirely on domestic goods.  An appealing feature of this model is that, in contrast with
most of the studies in this tradition, it allows for an explicit interaction between stocks and flows.  For
example, in steady state equilibrium the “current account deficit is equal to the exogenous flow of
foreign investment which, in turn, is equal to the level required to maintain the stock of foreign-held
assets constant” (page 99).   Additionally, this model has the virtue of tracing the dynamic adjustment of
the RER and other variables of interest following a specific shock.55
After calibrating the model for the case of Chile, Serven and Schmidt-Hebbel use it to evaluate
the effect of changes in fiscal policy on the real exchange rate and other macroeconomic variables.  In
particular, they study the effects of a “balanced budget” reduction in fiscal spending equivalent to 2
percentage points of GDP.  The cases of both a temporary and a permanent fiscal adjustment are
considered.  The results obtained suggest that this change in fiscal policy will have a very small effect on
the real exchange rate: a reduction in government spending of one percentage point of GDP will induce
a one percent depreciation of the RER, and will result in a small deterioration of the current account
deficit.  Interestingly enough, these results are not very different from those obtained in other studies
based on different (and simpler) methodologies, and suggest that, from a political economy perspective,
fiscal policy may not be the most effective tool for altering the equilibrium real exchange rate.
IV.3 What We Need to Know
The vast majority of the papers reviewed in this section --Serven and Schmidt-Hebbel being
the main exception--emphasize the estimation of misalignment at a specific moment in time, and are
subject to a number of limitations, including the “base year problem”, the limited attention to dynamic
issues, and the fact that stock equilibrium issues are largely ignored.  An additional limitation of the
papers reviewed in this section is that they do not deal in detail with the relationship between capital
flows and real exchange rates.  This issue, however, has become increasingly important in debates on
the optimal strategy for economic reform.  Some authors have argued that in considering the sequencing
of reform, policy makers should consider the fact that capital inflows generate a real exchange rate
appreciation.  This, in turn, reduces the degree of competitiveness of exports, and has important
political economy effects.  In fact, to the extent that exporters are usually among the early supporters of56
a reform effort, a reduction in exports’ competitiveness may frustrate the whole reform effort itself (see
Edwards 1992 for a discussion in these issue).  In the aftermath of the East Asian currency crises a
number of authors have argued that controls on capital inflows, similar to those implemented by Chile
during 1991-98, would help avoid the inflows-induced real exchange rate appreciation.  Although this
issue is still not fully resolved either at the theoretical or empirical levels, recent evidence suggests that in
those countries were they have been implemented, controls on capital mobility -- and in particular
controls on inflows --, have not been effective in reducing the extent of real exchange rate appreciation
(See Edwards 1999 for this discussion).  
Another limitation of most of the misalignment models reviewed in this section is the lack of a
well-defined relationship between the equilibrium real exchange rate and the current account balance. 
While the single equation models completely ignore the issue, those in the “general equilibrium
simulation” tradition tend to deal with it in a rather simplistic and mechanical way.  Future policy analysis
and evaluation would greatly benefit, however, by an explicit understanding of the way in which these
two key variables interact.  Two aspects of this problem are particularly important: first, the
intertemporal implications of the way in which the current account and the real exchange rate interact. 
Second, the role played (if any) by real exchange rates in analyses on current account sustainability (see
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 1998).
V.  Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed some of the most important exchange-rate related issues in
emerging economies.  We have concentrated our discussion on three broadly  defined issues:  (A) the
relative performance of alternative exchange rate regimes; (B) the long run behavior of real exchange57
rates, including whether there is any evidence suggesting that there is long-run convergence to PPP in
emerging economies; and (C) the assessment of situations of real exchange rate misalignment.
Throughout the paper we have argued that, although, the field has experienced tremendous
progress in the last few years, there are still a number of unresolved issues.  In particular, we argue that
the debate on the optimal exchange rate regime in emerging countries has been hampered by the lack of
genuine experiences with floating exchange rates.  In fact, most exchange rate regimes classified as
“floating” correspond to some kind of managed system.  We have also argued that there are still major
gaps in our understanding of the long run behavior of real exchange rates in the emerging countries.  In
contrast with the case of the advanced nations, the time series available for the emerging countries are
relatively short and, in many cases, the quality of the data is suspect.  An issue that has been the subject
of considerable debate refers to whether there is a (negative) relationship between productivity
differentials and real exchange rate behavior -- the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect.  The works
reviewed in this paper provide some preliminary (and weak) evidence in support of this effect.  Better
measures of productivity differentials would greatly benefit our understanding of this issue.  Our analysis
in section III dealt with alternative methods for assessing real exchange rate misalignment in developing
countries.  Here, as in the previous sections, we argued that in spite of evident progress in the last few
years, existing models are still subject to a number of limitations.  Chief among these are the absence of
explicit intertemporal considerations in empirical applications of these  models, a (still) superficial
understanding of the effects of capital inflows on real exchange rates, and the lack of a general
equilibrium connection between the equilibrium real exchange rate and the current account position of a
particular country.58
As we stated in the introduction, in writing this paper we have been forced to be selective,
concentrating only on a subset of exchange rate-related issues.  Some of the important issues that we
have not covered include: (a)  the relationship between real exchange rates -- both misalignment, as
well as volatility -- and economic performance, including growth.  (b) The role of nominal exchange rate
anchors in stabilization programs.   (c) The economics of “dollarization,” or optimal currency areas.  (D)
The role of exchange rates -- both nominal and real -- in the spreading of crises across countries.  
And, (E) the anatomy of currency crises in emerging economies.  While there is an extensive literature
on some of these subjects, such as currency crises, other are only beginning to attract attention among
scholars. 59
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1.  Of course, the table presents one of many possible taxonomies of exchange rate regimes.  For
alternative classifications along the criteria advanced in the (earlier) literature on the choice of exchange
rate regimes see Isard, 1995 (chapter 11) and Eichengreen and Masson, 1998.
2.  See Edwards, 1997, for a related evaluation of the World Bank’s contribution to the profession’s
understanding of the processes of trade liberalization and structural reform in LDCs.
3. This applies both to studies that focus on the relationship between nominal exchange rate regimes
and macroeconomic performance, as well as to those mentioned earlier that attempt to explain the
increased demand for “more flexible” exchange rate arrangements from a political economy angle.
4.  For example, countries with a de jure exchange rate system of “single currency peg with frequent
changes in parity” are classified as “pegged” by Ghosh et al., 1995 and as “flexible” in a related study
by Cottarelli and Giannini, 1997.
5. For an early analysis of a brief episode of floating exchange rates in a developing country (Peru)
during the Bretton Woods years see Edwards, 1983; see also Lyons, 1992.
6.  For a brief discussion of the feasibility and viability of floating exchange rates in developing and
transition economies see Corden, 1990, IMF, 1997 and Eichengreen and Masson, 1998.
7.  Officer, 1976 and Dornbusch, 1987 provide two earlier and influential surveys on the theory and
evidence on PPP up to the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, respectively.
8.  See, however, Edwards and Losada, 1994 and Edwards, 1995 for analyses of the time series
properties of inflation differentials (and the RER) in four Central American economies with long-lived
fixed exchange rate systems.
9.  The sample is intended to be representative, though not exhaustive.  In particular, we do not try to
present a comprehensive list of all the studies that apply unit root tests to RER series from LDCs as a
prior step for conducting other tests unrelated to PPP.
10.  This measure is commonly used in empirical work as a proxy for the relative price between
tradable and nontradable goods, i.e., the concept of the RER that follows from the “dependent
economy model” (see Edwards, 1989, Corden, 1990).
11. Counting the study by Edwards, 1995, which focused on countries that maintained a fixed
exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar during the sample period.
12.  Edwards, 1989 also constructed a RER series that used the parallel market exchange rate vis-a-vis
the U.S. dollar instead of the official exchange rate as the indicator of the value of the domestic
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currency.
13.  The other approach, testing PPP using several decades of data on exchange rates and prices, is
not a realistic option for the great majority of LDCs.  However, see Froot and Rogoff, 1995 for an
illustrative application of this approach to Argentine data covering the period 1913-1988. See also
Edwards and Losada, 1994.
14.  The share of developing countries’ data in the panels goes from 50 percent of the observations
(Oh, 1996, Table 3) to about 90 percent (Parsley and Popper, 1998, Table 1).
15.  To use these annual-frequency “fundamentals” in their monthly regressions the authors interpolated
yearly observations using June as the base month.  Of interest for our discussion of RER misalignment in
the following section is that the authors allude to the joint determination of the RER and the current
account as the reason for not including a measure of capital flows as an additional “fundamental” in the
RER regression.
16. Edwards, 1989 (chapter 7) obtained similar results for a sample of 39 devaluation episodes in
developing countries during the period 1960-1982.
17. These would include, in our view, the lack of explicit tests of the hypotheses of non-stationarity of
the RER series, not reporting a breakdown by income level and/or geographical location of the
countries driving the main results of the study, and several issues related to the choice and construction
of RER “fundamentals.”
18.  See Kravis et al., 1975, 1982, and Summers and Heston, 1988, 1991 for discussions of the
objectives, methodology, and data coverage of the ICP.
19.  Formally, the purchasing power of any given country is defined as PPP = G d (p / p ) where p i i i i
*
and p  are prices for individual commodity group i in the home country and the reference country i
*
measured in each country’s currency, and  d are a set of weights. i
20.  Not counting Balassa’s study which is included solely for comparative purposes.
21.  Despite the extended coverage and other methodological improvements of the later phases of the
ICP--i.e., the Penn World Tables Marks 4 and 5--that data continues to suffer from a number of
limitations that are particularly serious for time series analyses, such as the reliance on methods of
extrapolation to calculate observations from non-benchmark years and countries and the fixed 5-year
frequency of the benchmark surveys (Summers and Heston, 1988, 1991, Rogoff, 1996).  Results from
studies that use those time series for panel estimations of PPP hypotheses (e.g., Dollar, 1992, Connolly
and Devereux, 1995, Oh, 1996) should, therefore, be interpreted with caution and, to the extent
possible, cross-checked with evidence obtained from other data sets.73
22.  The standard references are Hsieh, 1982 (for Japan and Germany) and Marston, 1987 (for
Japan).  More recent studies that examine deviations from PPP in a larger sample of OECD countries
(using OECD data) include Asea and Mendoza, 1994 and de Gregorio et al., 1994; see Froot and
Rogoff, 1995 for a fuller list of references.
23.  The APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council) comprises 18 Pacific Basin countries
including Japan and the U.S.; Australia, Canada and New Zealand; China; the (former) East Asian
“tigers” and Chile and Mexico from Latin America.  Isard and Symansky analyses of RER trends
excluded Brunei, for lack of data, and the U.S., which was used as the numeraire country.
24.  See, for example, Edwards, 1988a, Cottani et al., 1990, and Ghura and Grennes, 1993.
25.  On the debates surrounding the Mexican 1994 devaluation see, for example, the essays collected
in Edwards and Naim, 1997.
26.  A concept of the RER that, as noted earlier, has its theoretical foundation in the “dependent
economy model.”
27.  On theoretical models of RER behavior see, for example, Edwards, 1989 and Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 1996.  On the derivation of reduced forms to derive the long run equilibrium real exchange rate
see Hinkle and Montiel, 1997.
28.  See Dornbusch, 1991, Edwards, 1989, and Hinkle and Montiel, 1997.
29.  Most authors, however, either ignore or do not specify clearly the source of these rigidities.  See
the discussion below.
30.  This methodology was suggested in Edwards, 1988a and applied in Edwards 1988b.  In a related
discussion Baffes, Elbadawi and O’Connell, 1997 identify three steps in the single equation
methodology.  
31.  We have chosen a linear functional form for equation (1) for expositional purposes.  Naturally, this
needs not be the case.  Baffes et al., 1997 also consider a linear representation of the equilibrium RER
in their analysis.
32.  As is argued below, however, computations based either on the single equation approach
(equation (3)) or on some version of PPP require defining a within-sample benchmark for the
equilibrium RER. 
33.  As in the case of the empirical literature on PPP presented in Table 3, the list of studies in Table 5
is intended to be representative, not exhaustive.  In particular, we do not include studies that estimate an
equation for the RER for a given country (or countries) but do not produce, assess or use for other
purposes a measure of RER misalignment.  Also, we have not included the study by Goldfajn and74
Valdés, 1996 (which we discuss extensively in Section III) even though it conforms with “steps” 1, 3
and 4, because the scope of that study (i.e., identify the “stylized facts” of appreciation episodes using
the largest database available) is much broader than that of the “typical” study on RER misalignment.
34.   The figure presents estimates of the model as of the first quarter of 1997.  RER is the actual
exchange rate, while GDDEEMER is the estimated equilibrium exchange rate; a higher value represents
a real depreciation.
35.  See for example Fontaine, 1992, and Dornbusch and Edwards, 1994.  Also, notice that the
estimates for Chile in Ades, 1996 do indicate that the RER was undervalued during 1987-89.
36.  Small economy versions of models in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995b could be used to
analyze these issues.
37. These analyses are (partially) based on the flow-stock approach suggested by Faruqee, 1995.  
38.  Some authors, however, have relied on crude estimates of misalignment in their analyses of
currency crises.  For instance, some have focused on straightforward PPP-based estimates; others,
such as Sachs et al., 1996 and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998 have defined misalignment as the
difference between the actual RER and some in-sample average or base period.